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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1985, the North Dakota Legislature substantially revised
North Dakota's Business Corporation Act.' The revised Act, which
will govern every North Dakota corporation by July 1, 1986,2
embodies a new involuntary dissolution statute. 3 The new statute
1. SeeActofApr. 4, 1985, ch. 1.:7, 1985 N.D. Sess. Laws 332(codified atN.D. CENT. CODEch.
10-19.1 (1985)).
2. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-04 (1985). AfterJune 30, 1986, the revised Act applies to all
existing North Dakota corporations. Id. Corporations in existence prior to July 1, 1985 may elect,
afterJune 30, 1985 and before July 1, 1986, to be governed by the revised Act. Id. § 10-19.1-03.
Corporations incorporated afterJune 30, 1985 are governed by the revised Act. See id. § 10-19.1-02.
3. Id. § 10-19.1-115. Section 10-19.1-115 of the North Dakota Century Code provides as
follows:
1. A court may grant any equitable relief it deems just and reasonable in the
circumstances or may dissolve a corporation and liquidate its assets and busines5:
a. In a supervised voluntary dissolution pursuant to section 10-19.1-114;
b. In an action by a shareholder when it is established that:
(1) The directors or the persons having the authority otherwise vested in the
board are deadlocked in the management of the corporate affairs and the
shareholders are unable to break the deadlock;
(2) The directors or those in control of the corporation have acted fraudulently,
illegally, or in a manner unfairly prejudicial toward one or more
shareholders in their capacities as shareholders, directors, or officersor as
employees of a closely held corporation;
(3) The shareholders of the corporation are so divided in voting power that, for
a period that includes the time when two consecutive regular meetings were
held, they have failed to elect successors to directors whose terms have
expired or would have expired upon the election and qualification of their
successors;
(4) The corporate assets are being misapplied or wasted; or
(5) The period of duration as provided in the articles has expired and has not
been extended-as provided in section 10-19.1-124.
c. In an action by a creditor when:
(1) The claim of the creditor has been reduced to judgment and an execution
thereon has been returned unsatisfied; or
(2) The corporation has admitted in writing that the claim of the creditor is due
and owing and it is established that the corporation is unable to pay its
debts in the ordinary course of business; or
d. In an action by the attorney general to dissolve the corporation in accordance
with section 10-19.1-118 when it is established that a decree of dissolution is
appropriate.
2. In determining whether to order equitable relief or dissolution, the court shall take
into consideration the financial condition of the corporation but may not refuse to
order equitable relief or dissolution solely on the ground that the corporation has
accumulated or current operating profits.
3. In determining whether to order equitable relief or dissolution, the court shall take
into consideration the duty which all shareholders in a closely held corporation owe
one another to act in an honest, fair, and reasonable manner in the operation of the
corporation and the reasonable expectations of the shareholders as they exist at the
inception and develop during the course of the shareholders' relationship with the
corporation and with each other.
4. If the court finds that a party to a proceeding brought under this section has acted
arbitrarily, vexatiously, or otherwise not in good faith, it may in its discretion
award reasonable expenses, including attorneys' fees and disbursements, to any of
the other parties.
5. Proceedings under this section must be brought in a court within the county in
which the registered office of the corporation is located. It is not necessary to make
shareholders parties to the action or proceeding unless relief is sought against them
personally.
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significantly expands the statutory grounds a court may rely on to
order involuntary dissolution. 4 According to the new statute, "[a]
court may grant any equitable relief it deems just and reasonable in
the circumstances or may dissolve a corporation and liquidate its
assets and business" in any number of specified situations.
5
The new involuntary dissolution statute proscribes certain
types of corporate behavior. 6 The proscriptions of the former
4. CompareAct of Mar. 8, 1983, ch. 138, § 1, 1983 N.D. Sess. Laws 381, 381, repealedby Act of
Apr. 4, 1985, ch. 147, S 24, 1985 N.D. Sess. Laws 332, 429 (current version at N.D. CENT. CODE §
10-19.1-118 (1985)) with N.D. CENT. CODE 5 10-19.1-115 (1985). The former statute provided for
the district court to decree involuntary dissolution only when a corporation procur.d its articles of
incorporation through fraud, continued to exceed or abuse the authority conferred upon it by law,
failed for thirty days to appoint and maintain a registered agent in the state, failed for thirty days
after change of its registered office or registered agent to file a statement of the change in the office of
the secretary of state, or failed for five years after the date of issuance of its certificate of incorporation
or certificate of organization to commence business and issue shares. Act of Mar. 8, 1983, ch. 138, §
1, 1983 N.D. Sess. Laws 381, 381, repealed by Act of Apr. 4, 1985, ch, 147, S 24, 1985 N.D. Sess.
Laws 332, 429 (current version at N.D. CENT. CODE 5 10-19.1-118 (1985)). The revised Act retains
most of the grounds for involuntary dissolution which are located in § 10-19.1-118 of the North
Dakota Century Code, and adds the new grounds for dissolution which are set forth in § 10-19.1-
115. SeeN.D. CENT. CODE 10-19.1-115, -118(1985). See supra note 3 forthe text ofl 10-19.1-115.
5. N.D. CENT. CODE 510-19.1-115(1) (1985). Subsection 10-19.1-115(1) of the North Dakota
Century Code lists specific grounds that authorize a court to dissolve a corporation and liquidate
its assets, but the broad grant of equitable powers to the court also allows the court to fashion any
remedy short of dissolution that it deems just and reasonable. See id. For the text of 5 10-19.1-115(1),
see supra note 3. One commentator has developed a list enumerating a wide variety of equitable
remedies supposedly available to a court under Minnesota's involuntary dissolution statute,
including:
(1) Cancelling, altering, or enjoining any resolution or other act of the
corporation;
(2) Directing or prohibiting any act of the corporation or of shareholders,
directors, officers, or other persons party to the action;
(3) Cancelling or altering any provision contained in the articles of incorporation
or by-laws of the corporation;
(4) Removing from office any director or officer, or ordering that a person be
appointed a director or officer;
(5) Requiring an accounting with respect to any [business] matters in a dispute;
(6) Appointing a custodian to manage the business and affairs of the corporation;
(10) Awarding damages to any aggrieved party in addition to, or in lieu of, any
other relief granted;
(11) Ordering the payment of dividends;
(12) Issuing an injunction to prohibit continuing acts of unfairly prejudicial
conduct;
(13) Permitting minority stockholders to purchase additional stock under conditions
specified by the court;
(14) Ordering dissolution of the corporation at a specified date, to become effective
only in the event that the stockholders fail to resolve their differences prior to
that date; landl
(15) Ordering that the corporation be liquidated and dissolved unless either the
corporation or one or more of the remaining shareholders has purchased all of
the shares of another shareholder at their fair value by a designated date.
Olson, A Statutory Elixirfor the Oppression Malady, 36 MERCER L. REV. 627, 643-45 (1985). This list of
possible remedies may be just as applicable to North Dakota's involuntary dissolution statute
because the Minnesota and North Dakota statutes are, in large part, identical. Compare N.D. CENT.
CODES 10-19.1-115(1)(1985) with MINN. STAT. ANN. S 302A.751 (1)(West 1985).
6. See N.D. CENT. CODE S 10-19.1-115 (1985). Section 10-19.1-115 provides that a corporation
may not misapply or waste assets, nor may the directors or those in control act in an unfairly
prejudicial manner toward the other shareholders. Id. S 10-19.1-115(1) (b) (2), (1) (b) (4). For the
text of S 10-19.1-115, see supra note 3.
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statute were few and the statute's remedy was available only
through an action brought by the attorney general. 7 In contrast, the
new statute condemns a wider variety of corporate behavior" and its
remedies are available through actions brought by shareholders, 9
creditors, 10 or the attorney general."
This Article addresses one particular application of the new
statute and the manner in which that application may affect
corporate behavior. Subsection 10-19.1-115(1)(b)(2) of the North
Dakota Century Code now allows a shareholder to obtain relief
when it is established that "[t]he directors or those in control of the
corporation have acted fraudulently, illegally, or in a manner
unfairly prejudicial toward one or more shareholders in their
capacities as shareholders, directors, or officers, or as employees of
a closely held corporation.' ' 2 A shareholder who can prove such
activity on the part of the directors or controlling shareholders
13
now has access to a statutory remedy. Under the former statute, a
shareholder found little relief. 14
The application of subsection 10-19.1-115(1)(b)(2) is to be
guided by another new provision, subsection 10-19.1-115(3). 15 In
determining whether to order equitable relief or dissolution,
subsection 10-19.1-115(3) provides:
[T]he court shall take into consideration the duty which
all shareholders in a closely held corporation owe one
another to act in an honest, fair, and reasonable manner
7. SeeAct of Mar. 8, 1983, ch. 138, S 1, 1983 N.D. Sess. Laws 381, 381, repealedbyAct ofApr. 4,
1985, ch. 147, 5 24, 1985 N.D. Sess. Laws 332, 429 (current version at N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-
118 (1985)). For a discussion of the former North Dakota dissolution statute, see supra note 4. See also
State ex rel Langer v. Gamble-Robinson Fruit Co., 44 N.D. 376, 176 N.W. 103 (1919) (corporate
charter may be cancelled in action by attorney general when corporation has participated in a
combination to fix prices and thereby abused its authority).
8. Compare Act of Mar. 8, 1983, ch. 138, 5 1, 1983 N.D. Sess. Laws 381, 381, repealed by Act of
Apr. 4, 1985, ch. 147, S 24, 1985 N.D. Sess. Laws 332, 429 (current version at N.D. CENT. CODE S
10-19.1-118 (1985)) with N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-115(1) (1985). For the types of corporate
behavior proscribed by the new involuntary dissolu(ion statute, see supra note 3.
9. N.D. CENT. CODE 5 10-19.1-115(l)(b) (1985).
10. Id. 5 10-19.1-115(1)(c).
I1I. Id. 10- 19.1-115(1)(d).
12. Id. S10-19.1-115(l)(b)(2).
13. For purposes of this article, the term "controlling shareholders" will be substituted for the
phrase "those in control" as used in § 10-19.1-115(l)(b)(2) of the North Dakota Century Code. See
N.D. CENT. CODE S 10-19.1-115(l)(b) (2) (1985).
14. See Act of Mar. 8, 1983, ch. 138, 5 1, 1983 N.D. Sess. Laws 381, 381, repealed by Act of Apr.
4, 1985, ch. 147, § 24, 1985 N.D. Sess. Laws 332, 429 (current version at N.D. CENT. ConE § 10-
19.1-118 (1985)). Only the attorney general could bring an action under the former North Dakota
involuntary dissolution statute. Id. If the wrong party brought an action under the statute, the
attorney general had to be substituted as the proper party plaintiff. See State v. Movius Land & Loan
Co., 53 N.D. 656, 666, 207 N.W. 492, 495-96 (1926) (substitution of attorney general as party
plaintiff cured original defect and allowed proceedings to continue as if originally commenced by
attorney general).
15. SeeN.D. CENT. CODE S 10-19.1-115(3)(1985).
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in the operation of the corporation and the reasonable
expectations of the shareholders as they exist at the
inception and develop during the course of the
shareholders' relationship with the corporation and with
each other.
16
These new provisions bring a number of new concepts to
North Dakota. Courts and practitioners must begin to assess what
type of behavior constitutes "unfairly prejudicial conduct," what it
means for a corporation to act in an "honest, fair, and reasonable
manner," and how a shareholder's "reasonable expectations"
affect her right to recovery. This Article does not provide a
"correct" interpretation of these concepts. Rather, it examines the
provisions of the North Dakota involuntary dissolution statute
within the context of two frameworks. The first framework justifies
court intervention into corporate affairs to protect shareholders
from unfair acts. The second framework justifies a court's
nonintervention and endorsement of the acts of the directors and
controlling shareholders. These frameworks not only provide the
arsenal with which to attack and defend corporate acts and
behavior, but also underscore the inherently political nature of the
law.17
This Article is limited to the application of the above
provisions to closely held corporations.1" Part II describes the
closely held corporation and the unique problems that confront it
and its shareholders. Part III describes the intervention framework,
the framework that the oppressed minority shareholders look to for
relief. Part IV describes the nonintervention framework, the
16. Id.
17. See Kennedy, Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A
PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 40 (D. Kairys ed. 1982). Kennedy argues that the legal rules and legal
reasoning taught in law are nothing more than political and economic justifications. Kennedy states:
It is true that there are distinctive lawyers' argumentative techniques for spotting
gaps, conflicts, and ambiguities in the rules, for arguing broad and narrow holdings of
cases, and for generating pro and con policy arguments. But these are only
argumentative techniques. There is never a "correct legal solution" that is other than
the correct ethical and political solution to that legal problem.
Id. at 47; see also Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1(1984);
Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 781 (1983); Note, 'Round and 'Round the Bramble Bush: From Legal Realism to Critical Legal
Scholarship, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1669 (1982).
18. A vast majority of the corporations in the United States may be considered closely held
corporations. See Conrad, The Corporate Census: A Preliminary Exploration, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 440, 458-
59 (1975) (nearly 95% of American corporations have 10 or fewer shareholders). In addition,
remedies such as those that may be imposed pursuant to § 10-19.1-115(1) of the North Dakota
Century Code have rarely, if ever. been imposed on corporations with more than 35 shareholders.
See Olson, supra note 5, at 637 n.69.
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framework that directors and controlling shareholders look to for
protection. Finally, Part V examines the new North Dakota
involuntary dissolution statute and its impact.
II. THE CLOSELY HELD CORPORATION
The term "closely held corporation"1 9 has defied precise
definition. 20 A closely held corporation typically has at least some of
the following attributes: (1) the shareholders are few in number,
often only two or three; (2) all or most of the shareholders are active
in the business; (3) there is no established market for the corporate
stock; and (4) the shareholders receive their return as employees in
the form of salaries and benefits. 21 Although these characteristics
are usually found in closely held corporations, exceptions exist.
22
The most popular judicial definition of a closely held
corporation is the one developed by the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court in Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. 23 In Donahue the
court deemed a closely held corporation to be typified by: (1) a
small number of shareholders; (2) no ready market for the
corporate stock; and (3) substantial majority shareholder
participation in the management, direction, and operation of the
corporation.
24
Statutes now commonly define a closely held corporation as a
corporation with no more than a certain number of shareholders.
2 5
19. The terms "close corporation" and "closely held corporation" are generally considered
synonymous and may be used interchangeably. See I F. O'NFL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS S 1.04 (2d
ed. 1971). To be consistent with the Business Corporation Act, this Article will use the term "closely
held corporation." See N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-01(6) (1985) (" 'Closely held corporation'
means a corporation which does not have more than thirty-five shareholders").
20. See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, -, 328 N.E.2d 505, 511 (1975);
Israels, The Close Corporation and the Law, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 488, 491 (1948); Peeples, The Use and
Misuse of the Business Judgment Rule in the Close Corporation, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 456, 465 (1985).
21. 1 F. O'NFAL, supra note 19, § 1.07; see I F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, OPPRESSION OF
MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS § 1:03 (2d ed. 1985); see also Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass.
578, __, 328 N.E.2d505, 511(1975).
22. Se Phelps v. Watson-Stillman Co., 365 Mo. 1124, -, 293 S.W.2d 429, 431 (Mo. 1956)
(corporation with 56 shareholders classified as closely held). It should also be noted that closely held
corporations are not always small corporations, but often have tremendous assets and worldwide
operations. For example, Ford Motor Company was commonly thought of as closely held until it
went public in 1955. See 1 F. O'NEAL, supra note 19, § 1.03.
23. 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975).
24. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 586, 328 N.E.2d 505, 511 (1975); see also
Alaska Plastics, Inc. v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270, 273 n.3 (Alaska 1980). Another popular judicial
definition of a closely held corporation is "one in which the stock is held in a few hands, or in a few
families, and wherein it is not at all, or only rarely, dealt in by buying or selling." Caller v. Galler,
32 Ill. 2d 16, 27, 203 N.E.2d 577, 583 (1965) (citing Brooks v. Willcuts, 78 F.2d 270, 273 (8th Cir.
1935)); seealso Sorlie v. Ness, 323 N.W.2d 841, 845 n.2 (N.D. 1982).
25. The following states define closely held corporations by the number of shareholders: ALA.
CODE § 10-2A-301(c) (1980) (30 shareholders); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-203A(3) (1977) (10
shareholders); CAL. CORP. CODE § 158(a) (West 1982) (10 shareholders); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
342 (1975) (30 shareholders); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 102(5) (1974) (20 shareholders);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.011(6)(a) (West 1985) (35 shareholders); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-
01(6) (1985) (35 shareholders); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-51(d) (1982)(30 shareholders).
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The use of a variety of maxima reflects the difficulty in
defining the closely held corporation. 26 North Dakota's Business
Corporation Act provides that a closely held corporation is "a
corporation which does not have more than thirty-five
shareholders." ' 27 While seemingly precise, some commentators
have suggested that certain corporations that have more than the
statutory maximum number of shareholders should be classified as
closely held despite their failure to comply with the statutory
definition.28
Because they are typically small businesses, closely held
corporations are often thought of as partnerships in corporate
form. 29 A small enterprise may decide to incorporate for any
number of reasons including a desire to acquire limited liability and
preferred tax treatment. 30 The incorporation decision is often given
little thought by the participants. Rarely do the shareholders
anticipate the problems that may arise, and even more rarely do
they enter into agreements to deal with such problems.
31
Invariably, the shareholders of a closely held corporation
begin the corporation's existence with high hopes and a consensus
26. See Hillman, The Dissatisfied Participant in the Solvent Business Venture: A Consideration of the
Relative Permanence of Partnerships and Close Corporations, 67 MINN. L. REV. 1, 64 (1982) (statutory
definitions of close corporations specifying a maximum number of shareholders reflect the range of
viewpoints on what constitutes a close corporation).
27. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10"19.1-01(6) (1985).
28. See, e.g., Olson, supra note 5, at 637 n 68. Olson suggests that when shareholding is broken
down upon clearly defined lines, such as by families, it may be appropriate in certain circumstances
to group shareholders before applying the numerical test. Id. Under this analysis, courts may apply
either an objective or subjective test. The Minnesota courts have rejected at least one attempt to
obscure the objective numerical test. See Sundberg v. Lambert Lumber Co., No. 465481 (Minn.
App..July 11. 1986) (corporation with more than 35 shareholders not closely held).
29. See, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 586, 328 N.E.2d 505, 512
(!975) (incorporated partnerships); Westland Capitol Corp. v. Lucht Eng'g, 308 N.W.2d 709, 712
(Minn. 1981) (partnership in corporate guise). See generally Dickinson, Partners in a Corporate Cloak: The
Emergence and Legitimacy of the Incorporated Partnership, 33 AM. UL. REV. 559, 569 (1984) (in many
cases, incorporated partnerships and close corporations are seemingly synonomous). The notion that
closely held corporations are analogous to partnerships has received some criticism. See Hillman,
supra note 26, at 64 (when a close corporation consists of 50 shareholders, it is questionable whether
the relationship among shareholders bears a significant resemblance to a corporation or partnership
with only two or three members).
30. See Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 167 N.J. Super. 141, __, 400 A.2d 554, 560
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979), aff'd per curiam, 173 N.J. Super. 559, 414 A.2d 994 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1980); 1 F. O'NEAL, supra note 19, § 1.08; Dickinson, supra note 29, at 566-67; Note,
Corporation Law-Meiselman v. Meiselman: "Reasonable Expectations" Determine Minority Shareholders'
Rights, 62 N.C. L. REV. 999, 1003-04 (1984).
31. See 1 F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 21, § 2:19 (shareholders in close corporations
often fail to appreciate potential problems); Dickinson, supra note 29, at 567 n.39 (lack of attention to
detail may leave organization with a structure inadequate to ensure the achievement of its goals);
O'Neal, Close Corporations: Existing Legislation and Recommended Reform, 33 Bus. LAW. 873, 883-84
(1978) (shareholders often fail to insist on a shareholders' agreement or appropriate charter or bylaw
provisions). A new development is the bringing of malpractice suits against lawyers who have
organized corporations without providing appropriate protection to minority shareholders. I F.
O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 21, at vii. The risk of malpractice liability is greatest when the
lawyer has represented both majority and minority shareholders in the organization of the
corporation. Id. Failure to include shareholder agreements that protect minority shareholders may
be viewed by the minority shareholders as a failure of the lawyer's duty to represent them. Id.
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concerning what the corporation is going to do and how it is going
to operate. 32 But in its beginnings, the seeds of discord are often
sown. Because the contributions of the shareholders may differ,
individual stock ownership percentages may also differ, thereby
creating a control position for one person or group. 33 Alternatively,
the simple fact that there may be more than two shareholders
creates the potential for the formation of a control group.
34
Closely held corporations are generally formed with the idea
that the two or three shareholders will be the employees, directors,
and officers of the corporation. 35 They generally expect that they
will receive their return primarily in the form of salaries rather than
dividends.36 Unfortunately, regardless of the shareholders' original
intentions, time and human nature have a way of breaking down
the consensus and creating a divergence of interests. 37 Personal
relationships may become so strained that the shareholders find
that they are no longer capable of working with each other. 38
The case of Meiselman v. Meiselman39 is reflective of much of the
animosity and bitterness that often arises in shareholder disputes.
In Meiselman two brothers owned all of the stock of several inter--
32. See Hetherington & Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation: A Proposed Statutory Solution to the
Remaining Close Corporation Problem, 63 VA. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1977) (typically, close corporations are
formed by individuals who have a "complete identity of interests and strong feelings of trust for one
another").
33. Davidian, Corporate Dissolution in New York: Liberalizing the Rights of Minority Shareholders, 56
ST.JOHN'S L. REV. 24, 26 (1981); see also Note, supra note 30, at- 1004. The commentator contends
that if the majority and minority shareholders cannot reconcile a disagreement over corporate
policy, the disagreement will be resolved in favor of the majority shareholders. Id. This result occurs
because the majority shareholders' control of the board of directors and ownership of the majority of
voting shares allows them to control corporate decision making. Id.
34. See, e.g., Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842, -, 353 N.E.2d 657,
659-61 (1976). For a discussion of Wilkes, see infra notes 61-75 and accompanying text.
35. O'Neal, supra note 31, at 884-85; Note, Involuntary Dissolution of Close Corporations for
Mistreatment of Minority Shareholders, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 1119, 1139-40 (1982); see Exadaktilos v.
Cinnaminson Realty Co., 167 N.J. Super. 141, __, 400 A.2d 554, 561 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
19.79), aff'dper curiam, 173 N.J. Super. 559, 414 A.2d 994 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980) (plaintiff
expected employment and participation in management); In re Topper, 107 Misc.2d 25, -, 433
N.Y.S.2d 359, 365 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980) (plaintiff expected employment and active management
position).
36. 1 F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 21, S 1:03; see Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty
Co.. 167 N.J. Super. 141, -, 400 A.2d 554, 561 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979), aff'd per
curiam, 173 N.J. Super. 559, 414 A.2d 994 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980) (shareholders generally
expect that their return will be received in the form of salaries); see also In re Topper, 107 Misc.2d 25,
__, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359, 365 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980) (shareholders' bargain includes salary). The
earnings of a closely held corporation are generally paid in salaries to avoid the double taxation of
dividends. 1 F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 21, § 1:03.
37. Hetherington &Dooley, supra note 32, at 3. The authors note that many factors contribute
to a breakdown of consensus in a close corporation. Id. For example, a change in the nature of the
enterprise may render once valuable shareholder contributions irrelevant, or a shareholder may
simply realize that her talents and capital can be invested more profitably elsewhere. Id.
38. Id.," see I F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 21, §§ 2:02-07. O'Neal and Thompson
discuss a variety of causes for strained shareholder relationships, including: greed, a desire for
power, personality clashes, family quarrels, inactive shareholders, the death of a key shareholder,
and the existence of an autocratic controlling shareholder. Id.
39. 309 N.C. 279, 307 S.E.2d 551 (1983); see also Note, supra note 30; Note, A New Approach to
Fulfilling Shareholders' Expectations in Close Corporations: Meiselman v. Meiselman, 20 WAKE FOREST L.
R v. 505 (1984).
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related family corporations, with Ira Meiselman owning
approximately seventy percent of the total shares of the family
corporations and Michael Meiselman owning the remaining
shares.4 0  When Michael brought suit against Ira seeking
dissolution of the family corporations, Ira responded by claiming
that Michael suffered from crippling mental disorders. 41  In
apparent support of his allegation, Ira related an argument that
Michael had with their father in which their father castigated
Michael for bringing a Gentile woman to a family function.4 2 Ira
testified to another fight that he and Michael had which stemmed
from Ira's failure to invite Michael to a football game to which all
the males in the family traditionally had been invited.4 3 Needless to
say, it is not surprising that Ira and Michael were incapable of
carrying on the family business.- While disagreements between
shareholders may not always lead to allegations of mental infirmity,
they can quickly lead to a falling out among the shareholders.
Once a falling out among the shareholders occurs, the
minority shareholder in a closely held corporation has few options.
Disagreements over corporate policy will be resolved in favor of the
controlling shareholders .44 The controlling shareholders'
ownership of a majority of the stock and their resulting control of
the board of directors enables them to control corporate decision
making. 4 5 There is little that the minority shareholder can do. The
dissatisfied shareholder in a publicly held corporation may
withdraw her investment by selling her stock. 46 A dissatisfied
40. Meiselman v. Meiselman, 309 N.C. 279, -, 307 S.E.2d 551, 553 (1983). Michael and
Ira acquired ownership of the corporations from their parents through a series of gifts and bequests.
Id. at __ , 307 S.E.2d at 553.
41. Id. at __, 307 S.E.2d at 556. Michael contended that Ira had restricted Michael's access to
corporate offices and information and excluded him from participating in corporate matters. Id. at
__ 307 S.E.2d at 555. Michael also contended that Ira acquired and sold corporate assets without
his consent. Id. Ira countered by contending that Michael's limited participation was voluntary. Id.
42. Id. at__ , 307 S.E.2d at 556.
43. Id.
44. See Note, supra note 30, at 1004; see also 1 F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 21, § 3:03.
O'Neal contends that "[in the absence of some special control arrangement, set up by contract or
special charter or bylaw provision, a corporation is subject to the principle of majority rule: holders
of a majority of the voting shares govern." Id.
45. See Note, supra note 30, at 1004. The commentator contends that the minority shareholders
will soon discover that the personal relationship and expectations of mutual decision making will be
frustrated by the majority rule doctrine. Id see also 1. F. O'NEIL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 21, S
1:02 (under the principle of majority rule, the holders of a majority of the shares with voting power
control the corporation).
46. Olson, supra note 5, at 628; see also Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578,
328 N.E.2d 505, 514 (1975) (opprc,,sed stockholder in a public corporation can sell his stock to
recoup his investment in-contrast to a close corporation in which, by definition, no market is avail-
able for shares); Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 167 N.J. Super. 141, -, 400 A.2d 554,
560 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979), aff'd per curiam, 173 N.J. Super. 559, 414 A.2d 994 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980) (although the marketplace usually provides a remedy for oppressed
shareholders in a publicly held corporation, this remedy is not readily available to minority
shareholders in a closely held corporation).
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partner may dissolve a partnership.47 Only in a closely held
corporation may the shareholder find her investment locked in with
little hope of freeing it.48 Investors are seldom willing to purchase
less than a controlling interest in a closely held corporation. 49 Nor
will the controlling shareholders be inclined to purchase the interest
of the minority shareholder. All the majority can gain by
purchasing the minority shareholder's interest are those earnings
attributable to her investment that they are unable to capture by
manipulating their control position.50 The minority shareholder
can neither sell her interest to an outsider nor entice the controlling
shareholders to purchase her interest at a fair value. The illiquidity
of her investment puts her in a precarious situation. 51
When dissatisfaction and dissension arise, the minority
shareholder becomes vulnerable to freeze-outs.5 2 Freeze-outs are
actions taken by the controlling shareholders to deprive a minority
shareholder of her interest in the business or a fair return on her
investment. 53 A variety of freeze-out techniques exist, 54 with the
47. See Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 32, at 3; Olson, supra note 5, at 628; see also Donahue
v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, -, 328 N.E.2d 505, 514 (1975) (in contrast to a
partnership, an abused shareholder may not dissolve a corporation at will and recover his share of
profits and assets).
48. See 1 F. O'NEIL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 21, § 1:03, Olson, supra note 5, at 628. O'Neal
and Thompson explain the dilemma faced by a dissatisfied shareholder in a close corporation as
follows:
A dissatisfied shareholder cannot withdraw the funds he has invested, and he cannot
find a purchaser for his interest. Seldom can anyone be found who is willing to buy a
minority interest in a close corporation, especially if the company is divided by bitter
disputes. A minority shareholder may have all or a substantial part of his capital
invested in the company, and yet he cannot regain his capital without the consent of
the very people with whom he is at loggerheads.
I F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 21, § 1:03, at 6; see also Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co.,
367 Mass. 578, -, 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (1975) (no outsider would knowingly assume the
position of the disadvantaged minority to encounter the same difficulties).
49. See 1 F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 21, 5 1:03; Hetherington & Dooley, supra note
32, at 5; see also Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, -, t28 N.E.2d 505, 515
(1975) ("freeze-out" schemes employed by the majority are designed to compel the minority to
relinquish stock at inadequate prices).
50. Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 32, at 5. The authors contend that the majority may gain
freedom from potential inconvenience or harassment on the part of the opposing minority by
purchasing the minority's interest, if the majority attaches any value to those concerns. Id.
51. Id. at 6. The authors note that a close corporation is unique because it "subjects an owner to
the dual hazards of a complete loss of liquidity and an indefinite exclusion from sharing in the
p rofitability of the firm" Id see also Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, - 328
N.E.2d 505, 513 (1975) (majority has won when minority is compelled to sell at less than a fair
price).
52. See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, -, 328 N.E.2d 505, 513 (1975);
Note, supra note 30, at 1004-05, 1010. The term "squeeze-out," the term preferred by O'Neal and
Thompson, is considered synonymous with the term "freeze-out." See 1 F. O'NEAt & R.
THOMPSON, supra note 21, § 1:01 n.2. The term "freeze-out" is used in this Article.
53. Note, supra note 30, at 1005; see also Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 167 N.J.
Super. 141, -, 400 A.2d 554, 560 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979), aff'd per curiam, 173 N.J.
Super. 559, 414 A.2d 994 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980); 2 F. O'NEAL, supra note 19, § 8.07. The
economic consequences of freeze-outs are significant. See 1 F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note
21, § 1:04. O'Neal and Thompson contend that "[freeze-outs] and attempted [freeze-outs]
undoubtedly bring to thousands of businesses each year friction and strife, impaired efficiency of
managers, heavy loss of working hours by key personnel, expensive litigation, and diminished
confidence in the business and its managers by banks, suppliers, customers and employees." Id. at 8.
54. See 1 F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, suPra note 21, §§ 3:02 to :20. There are numerous freeze-
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withholding of dividends being by far the most commonly applied
technique. 55 This technique is often combined with the discharge of
the minority shareholder from employment and removal of the
minority shareholder from the board of directors.5 6 If the minority
shareholder is employed by the corporation full time, as is typical,
and if she relies on her salary as her primary means of obtaining a
return on her investment, as is typical, she is suddenly left with
little or no income and little or no return on her investment.57 The
controlling shareholders may effectively deprive the minority
shareholder of every economic benefit that she derives from the
corporation. 58  Meanwhile, the controlling shareholders may
continue to receive a substantial return based on their continuing
employment with the corporation. The minority shareholder's
investment serves only to ensure the success of the corporation for
the benefit of the controlling shareholders.
59
Examples of such behavior on the part of controlling
shareholders are common. 60 A review of one such case provides a
flavor of the type of activity that may exist. In Wilkes v. Springside
Nursing Home, Inc. 61 four investors formed a corporation to operate
a nursing home. 62 Each of the parties invested the same amount of
money with the understanding that each would be a director and
out techniques that controlling shareholders may use to oppress a minority shareholder, including:
withholding dividends, excluding a minority shareholder from employment, paying themselves
excessively high compensation for services rendered, withholding information, usurping corporate
opportunities, siphoning off corporate earnings by leases and loans favorable to themselves, and
having the corporation purchase their shares at a high price. Id.
55. 1 F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 21, § 3:04; Note, supra note 30, at 1005. O'Neal
and Thompson state that the withholding of dividends is frequently used because it is easily applied
and generally exerts great pressure on minority shareholders to sell their shares. 1 F. O'NEAL & R.
THOMPSON, supra note 21, 5 3:04. The withholding of dividends is often used when the minority
shareholder is dependent upon income from dividends and is in financial straits. Id.
56. 1 F. O'NEAL & R. THoMtPSON, supra note 21, § 3:04, :06; see Wilkes V. Springside Nursing
Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842, __, 353 N.E.2d 657, 662 (1976) (effective freeze-out technique is to
deprive minority shareholder of employment); Note, supra note 30, at 1005 (controlling shareholder
will ordinarily fire minority shareholder).
57. See I F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 21, § 1:03; Olson, supra note 5, at 628; see also
Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, -, 328 N.E.2d 505, 514 (1975) (minority
stockholder typically invests a substantial portion of his personal assets in the corporation and
anticipates that his salary will be his livelihood).
58. Note, supra note 30, at 1005. One student of corporate law notes that in a freeze-out by the
controlling group, the majority will ordinarily fire the minority shareholder and cut her off from any
return on her investment. Id. Thus, the minority shareholder will hope to withdraw from the
corporation with her investment and may consider involuntary dissolution as the only available
recourse. Id.
59. See Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 32, at 5-6; Olson, supra note 5, at 628.
60. See, e.g., Alaska Plastics, Inc. v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270 (Alaska 1980); Donahue v. Rodd
Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975); In re Topper, 107 Misc.2d 25, 433
N.Y.S.2d 359 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980).
61. 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657 (1976).
62. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842, -, 353 N.E.2d 657, 659
(1976). Wilkes acquired an option to purchase a lot and building that had previously housed a
hospital. Id. Riche, an acquaintance of Wilkes, persuaded Pipkin and Quinn to join it) Wilkes'
investment. Id. The parties subsequently decided that the property would be most profitable if it
was operated as a nursing home. Id.
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that each would participate in the management and operation of
the corporation. 63 The parties also understood that each would
receive money from the corporation in equal amounts as long as
each assumed an active and continuing responsibility for the
business.64
A dispute developed between two of the shareholders, Quinn
and Wilkes, over the sale of some property. 65 The two other
shareholders sided with Quinn.6 6 As a consequence of the dispute,
the board of directors terminated Wilkes' salary and increased
Quinn's compensation. 67 At the next meeting of the shareholders,
Wilkes failed to win reelection as either a director or officer of the
corporation. 68 The other shareholders informed Wilkes that neither
his services nor his presence at the nursing home was desired. 69
The court noted that the acts of the other shareholders were taken
because of their personal desire to prevent Wilkes from receiving
income from the corporation.70 Because the corporation had never
paid dividends, Wilkes' salary had been his only source of return
on his investment. 7' Because of these actions, Wilkes brought suit
against the corporation and its shareholders. 72
When a minority shareholder is confronted with a situation
like the one in Wilkes, she has little choice but to bring suit in an
63. Id. at_ , 353 N.E.2d at 659-60.
64. Id. at_, 353 N.E.2d at660.
65. Id. The animosity between the shareholders started when they decided to sell a portion of the
corporate property to Quinn. Id. Quinn not only held stock in the nursing home, but also possessed
an interest in another corporation that hoped to operate a rest home on the property. Id. Wilkes
succeeded in convincing the other shareholders to procure a higher sale price for the property than
Quinn anticipated or desired to pay. Id. After the sale was completed, the relationship between
Quinn and Wilkes deteriorated, which also affected the attitudes of the other stockholders. Id.
Because of the strained relations among the parties, Wilkes gave notice of his intention to sell his
shares based upon their appraised values. Id. at __ , 353 N.E.2d at 660-61.
66. Id. at 661.
67. Id. The board of directors held a meeting and established the salaries of its officers and
directors. Id. A schedule of payments was established, with Quinn to receive a substantial increase in




71. Id. The directors and shareholders held meetings for the purpose of forcing Wilkes out of
active participation in the management and operation of the corporation and to cut him off from all
corporate payments. Id. Although the board had the power to dismiss officers for misconduct or
neglect of duties, Wilkes' dismissal was not based on either of these grounds. Id. Rather, Wilkes was
dismissed solely because the other stockholders desired to freeze him out. Id. There was evidence that
despite the strained personal relationship with the other stockholders, Wilkes continued to perform
his responsibilities to the corporation in a satisfactory and competent manner. Id. at __ , 353
N. E.2d at 661, 664.
72. Id. at __ , 353 N.E.2d at 659. Wilkes sought damages based on the amount of salary he
would have received from his positions as officer and director had it not been for the freeze-out. Id.
Wilkes also sought damages from the majority shareholders for breach of their fiduciary duty. Id.
The court reached the "inescapable conclusion" that the action of the majority was a designed
"freeze-out" with no legitimate business purpose. Id. at __, 353 N.E.2d at 664. The court held
that the majority shareholders had breached their fiduciary duty to Wilkes as a minority shareholder
and ordered damages against the majority for the amount of salary Wilkes would have received had
he remained an officer and director of the corporation. Id. at __, 353 N.E.2d at 664-65.
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attempt to obtain some sort of remedy. Ordinarily, neither the
articles of incorporation nor the bylaws of the corporation will
provide relief. A shareholder agreement, if one exists, is rarely
applicable.7 3 While the controlling shareholders may offer to
purchase the minority shareholder's stock, the offer invariably
values the stock at less than a fair price. 74 The freeze-out effectively
eliminates the minority shareholder from the corporation and
leaves her with nothing more than a lawsuit. 
75
III. THE INTERVENTION FRAMEWORK
The intervention framework is based upon decisions in which
courts have intervened to protect the rights of a minority
shareholder. Courts have used a variety of justifications to reach
decisions that prevent controlling shareholders from engaging in
freeze-out activities. 76 Regardless of the particular justification
employed, courts operating within the intervention framework
ensure that those in control act fairly. Controlling shareholders are
not allowed to take actions that prevent the minority shareholder
from obtaining a return on her investment. The courts stand ready
to intervene to set things right.
A. INTERVENTION IN THE ABSENCE OF STATUTORY AUTHORITY
The general rule at common law was that, absent statutory
authority, courts had no jurisdiction to grant a dissolution at the
request of a minority shareholder.77 Despite the general rule, a
number of courts acknowledged their equitable power to dissolve a
corporation and protect a minority shareholder.7 8 In Miner v. Belle
73. See O'Neal, supra note 31, at 883-84 (shareholder agreements rarely anticipate
disagreements or contain protective arrangements).
74. See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, __, 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (1975)
('freeze-out" schemes are designed to compel the minority to relinquish stock at inadequate prices);
Note, supra note 35, at 1121.
75. See Note, supra note 30, at 1005 (in a freeze-out the majority shareholders attempt to deprive
the minority shareholder of every benefit derived from the corporation); Note, supra note 35, at 1122-
23 (filing for involuntary dissolution may be minority shareholder's only protection against
mistreatment by the majority).
76. One justification for preventing freeze-out activities is that the controlling shareholders have
operated the corporation for their own benefit. See infra text accompanying notes 80-83. A second
justification is that the controlling shareholders have oppressed the minority shareholder. See infra
text accompanying notes 88-101. A third justification is that the controlling shareholders breached
their fiduciary duty to the minority shareholder. See infra text accompanying notes 102-121. A final
justification is that the controlling shareholders frustrated the reasonable expectations of the minority
shareholder. See infra text accompanying notes 122-149.
77. See Rowland v. Rowland, 102 Idaho 534, -, 633 P.2d 599, 605 (1981); Fix v. Fix
Material Co., 538 S.W.2d 351,357 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); Note, supra note 35, at 1125.
78. See, e.g., Ross v. American Banana Co., 150 Ala. 268, __, 43 So. 817, 817 (1907)
(shareholder had cause of action for dissolution when failure of corporate purpose had occurred);
Graham v. McAdoo, 135 Ky. 677, __ 123 S.W. 260, 262 (1909) (dissolution proper when
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Isle Ice Co. 7 9 the Michigan Supreme Court provided a precedent
for courts that wished to intervene, notwithstanding an absence of
statutory authority. In Miner a minority shareholder complained
that the controlling shareholder refused to pay dividends, paid
himself an excessive salary as the president and manager of the
corporation, and generally operated the corporation solely for his
own personal benefit.80 The court concluded that a court of equity
has the power to dissolve a corporation when a controlling
shareholder uses his control to operate the corporation for his own
benefit and causes a loss to the minority shareholder. 8' The court
reasoned that a corporation has a duty to dissolve itself when it has
failed to fulfill the purposes for which it was created.82
A number of courts followed the lead of the Miner decision.8 3
In fact, it is now claimed that the general common-law rule is that
courts of equity possess an inherent power to protect a minority
shareholder from oppressive or abusive conduct.8 4 As a result,
intervention absent statutory authority has become justified when
the controlling shareholders have engaged in certain behavior. The
framework thus protects minority shareholders.
B. STATUTORY GROUNDS FOR RELIEF - THE OPPRESSION
ANALYSIS
Mistreatment of minority shareholders first became a
statutory ground for relief in 1933 when the Illinois Legislature
adopted fraudulent, illegal, or oppressive activity as grounds for
relief.8 5 The Illinois legislation served as an example for other
corporate ruin is inevitable due to mismanagement); Ponca Mill Co. v. Mikesell, 55 Neb. 98, 101-
02, 75 N.W. 46, 48 (1898) (gross mismanagement and misappropriation of corporate property
justifies dissolution).
79. 93 Mich. 97, 53 N.W. 218 (1892).
80. See Miner v. Bell Isle Ice Co., 93 Mich. 97, 98-108, 53 N.W. 218, 218-21 (1892).
81. See id. at l17, 53 N.W. at 224.
82. Id. at 112-13, 53 N.W. at 223. The court acknowledged that the general rule was that courts
had no power to dissolve a corporation absent statutory authority, but recognized exceptions to that
rule. Id. at 112, 53 N.W. at 223. The court noted that the ultimate objective of every business
corporation is the pecuniary gain of its shareholders and that this is the only reason capital has been
advanced. Id. at 113, 53 N.W. at 223. If circumstances render it impossible to continue making
profits for the shareholders, it is the duty of the management of the corporation to wind up its affairs.
Id.
83. See supra note 78; see also Bellevue Gardens, Inc. v. Hill, 297 F.2d 185 (D.C. Cir. 1961);
Levant v. Kowal, 350 Mich. 232, 86 N.W.2d 336 (1957); Leibert v. Clapp, 13 N.Y.2d 313, 196
N.E.2d 540, 247 N.Y.S.2d 102 (1963).
84. See Note, supra note 39, at 515; Note, supra note 35, at 1125..Just as exceptions to the former
common-law rule existed, exceptions to the current common-law rule also exist. See Note, supra note
35, at 1125-26 (courts will not grant dissolution when controlling group advances best interests and
purpose of corporation in good faith). The fact that exceptions exist to both the former and current
cmmon-law rules reflects the folly ofclaiming the existence ofa gencral coimtson-law rule.
85. The Business Corporation Act of 1933, § 86(a)(2), 1933 Ill. Laws 308, 351 (repealed 1984)
(current version at IL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 12.50(b)(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986)).
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states. A majority of states now have statutes that allow liquidation
or dissolution upon proof that the controlling shareholders acted in
an illegal, fraudulent, or oppressive manner.
8 6
To obtain relief on such grounds, minority shareholders
invariably asserted that the actions of the controlling shareholders
were oppressive. 87 When courts wished to protect the minority
shareholders, the courts characterized the acts of the controlling
shareholders in such a manner as to bring the acts within the
definition of oppression. 88  For example, in Gidwitz v. Lanzit
Corrugated Box Co. 89 shareholders brought an action against the
controlling shareholders alleging, among other things, that the
controlling shareholders had committed illegal, fraudulent, and
oppressive acts. 90 During a ten year period, the controlling
shareholders held no annual shareholder meetings. 91  The
president, a member of the controlling shareholder group,
essentially operated and managed the corporation as a sole
proprietorship. 92  In reviewing the acts of the controlling
shareholders, the court was quick to note that oppressive behavior
was not synonymous with illegal or fraudulent behavior. 93 In
language recalling the equitable standard established by Miner, the
court held that the controlling shareholders had operated the
corporation for their own benefit, thereby depriving the other
86. See, e.g., ALA. CODE S 10-2A-195(a)(1)(b) (1980); ALASKA STAT. 5 10.05.540(2) (1985); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 64-908(A)(2) (1980); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-8-113(2)(a) (Supp. 1985); IDAHO CODE S
30-1-97(a)(2) (1980); IOWA CODE ANN. § 496A.94(1)(c) (West Supp. 1985); MD. CORPS. & Ass'Ns
CODE ANN. § 3-413(b)(2) (1985); Miss. CODE ANN. S 79-3-193(a)(2) (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
351.485 (1)(1)(b) (Vernon 1966); MONT. CODE ANN. 535-2-711 (a)(ii) (1985); NEB. REV. STAT. S
21-2096(1)(b) (1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. S 53-16-16(A)(l)(b) (1983); OR. REV. STAT. S
57.595(1)(a)(B) (1985); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, 5 2107 (A)(2) (Purdon 1967); R.I. GEN. LAWS 5 7-
1.1-90(a)(1)(B) (1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-7-34(2) (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. S 48-1-
1008(a)(1)(C) (1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-92(a)(2) (Supp. 1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §
2067(a)(1)(B) (1984); VA. CODE 5 13.1-747(A)(.1)(b) (1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
23A.28.170(1)(b) (1969); W. VA. CODE § 31-1-41(a)(2) (1982); Wyo. STAT. § 17.1-1-614(a)(i)(B)
(Supp. 1985).
87. See, e.g., Coduti v. Hellwig, 127 Il. App. 3d 279, -, 469 N.E.2d 220, 225 (1984); Fix v.
Fix Material Co., 538 S.W.2d 351, 357 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
88. See, e.g., Gidwitz v. Lanzit Corrugated Box Co., 20 111. 2d 208, 170 N.E.2d 131 (1960).
89. 20 Ill. 2d 208, 170 N.E.2d 131 (1960).
90. Gidwitz v. Lanzit Corrugated Box Co., 20 I11. 2d 208, 212. 170 N.E.2d 131, 133 (1960). In
Gidwt*I, the stock of the corporation was split 50-50 between two dissident families. Id. at 215, 170
N.E.2d at 135. One group, the Gidwitz faction, was able to completely control and manage the
corporation to the exclusion of the other shareholder group by virtue ofJoseph Gidwitz's position as
president and chief executive officer of the corporation. Id. at 215, 170 N.E.2d at 135-36.
91. Id. at 215, 170 N.E.2d at 136. The court noted that the failure to hold annual shareholder
meetings effectively deprived the piaintiff group of their right to vote for directors of the corporation.
Id. at 216, 170 N.E.2d at 136.
92. See id. The court noted !hat the voting power was evenly split between the directors of the
corporation. Id. Because of an irreconcilable split in all matters pertaining to management of the
corporation, Joseph Gidwitz, as president, could effectively control the operation and management
of the corporation regardless of the views of the other half of the shareholders and directors. Id.
Joseph did this by avoiding shareholder and director meetings and failing to call to the attention of
the other directors or shareholders anything that could affect his control or management. Id. at 217,
170 N.E.2d at 137.
93. Id. at 215, 170 N.E.2d at 135.
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shareholders of their rights and privileges.9 4 Because the controlling
shareholders' behavior constituted oppressive conduct for which
the future held little hope of abatement, dissolution was justified. 95
While it was clear that the existence of controlling shareholders
operating the corporation for their own benefit was a sufficient
basis to justify relief under the oppression standard, the sufficiency
of other conduct justifying relief was unclear. 96 Instead of relying
on the rather limited definition of oppression developed by Illinois
decisions, 9 a number of courts looked elsewhere for a more
comprehensive perspective. 98  Oppression became viewed as
'burdensome, harsh and wrongful conduct,' 'a lack of probity
and fair dealing in the affairs of a company to the prejudice of some
of its members,' or 'a visible departure from the standards of fair
dealing, and a violation of fair play on which every shareholder
who entrusts his money to a company is entitled to rely. '"99 This
broader definition justified the intervention of a number of courts
to protect the interests of minority shareholders. 00 It was a rather
simple matter for courts to characterize acts as a violation of fair
play.
94. Id. at 216, 170 N.E.2d at 136. The court stated that "[tihe essential attribute of a
shareholder in a corporation is that he is entitled to participate, according to the amount of his stock,
in the selection of the management of the corporation, and he cannot be deprived or deprive himself
of that power." Id. at 215, 170 N.E.2d at 135. The court noted a continuing course of conduct on the
part of Joseph Gidwitz and the controlling group to exclude the plaintiffs from participating in the
management of the corporation. Id. at 216, 170 N.E.2d at 136. In addition, Joseph refused to follow
the corporate bylaws or subordinate his actions or advice to the board of directors. Id.
95. Id. at 221, 170 N.E.2d at 138.
96. See, e.g., Gidwitz v. Lanzit Corrugated Box Co., 20 11. 2d 208, 170 N.E.2d 131 (1960). In
Gidwitz the court defined oppression by discussing what oppression was not, rather than what it was.
See id. at 214-15, 170 N.E.2d at 135. The court stated as follows:
We have held that the word "oppressive" as used in this statute, does not carry
an essential inference of imminent disaster .... The word does not necessarily savor
of fraud, and the absence of "mismanagement, or misapplication of assets," does not
prevent a finding that the conduct of the dominant directors or officers has been
oppressive. It is not synonymous with "illegal" and "fraudulent."
Id.
97. For a discussion of the Illinois definition of oppression, see supra note 96. See also Central
Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 10 IIl. 2d 566, 573-74, 141 N.E.2d 45, 50 (1957).
98. British cases construing the oppression standard of section 210 of the British Company Act
of 1948 provided a broader perspective. See Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, ch. 38, § 210,
repealed by Companies Act, 1980, ch, 22, S 88(2), Sched. 4; Companies Act, 1980, ch. 22, S 75(11)
(current version at Companies Act, 1985; see, e..., Scottish Co-op. Wholesale Soc'y, Ltd. v. Meyer,
[1958] 3 All E.R. 66, 71, 86 (H.L.); Elder v. Elder & Watson, Ltd., [1952] Sess. Cas. 49, 55.
99. Comment, Oppression as a Statutory Ground.for Corporate Dissolution, 1965 DUKE L.J. 128, 134
(footnotes omitted) (quoting Scottish Co-op. Wholesale Soc'y, Ltd. v. Meyer, [1958] 3 All E.R. 66,
71 (H.L.); Elder v. Elder & Watson, Ltd., [1952] Sess. Cas. 49, 55) (quotedin Baker v. Commercial
Body Builders, Inc., 264 Or. 614, -., 507 P.2d 387, 393 (1973)); see also Fix v. Fix Material Co.,
538 S.W.2d 351, 358 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); White v. Perkins, 213 Va. 129, __, 189 S.E.2d 315,
319-20 (1982). This broader definition of oppression was based on earlier British decisions. See supra
note 98.
100. See, e.g., Skierka v. Skierka Bros., 629 P.2d 214, 200-222 (Mont. 1981); White v. Perkins,
213 Va. 129, -_, 189 S.E.2d 315,320 (1982).
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1. Concept of an Enhanced Fiduciary Duty
The comprehensive definition of oppression used by some
courts provided a basis for relief. Certain refinements in its
application, however, created further justification for a court's
intervention and significantly increased the power of the
intervention framework. Oppression became a more attractive
avenue for relief when it was combined with the notion of the
controlling shareholders' fiduciary duty. Courts began to
acknowledge that if the controlling shareholders breached their
fiduciary duty to the minority shareholders, oppression resulted. 101
The duty owed to minority shareholders was described in the
landmark decision of Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. 102 In Donahue
the plaintiff was a minority shareholder in a closely held
corporation. 0 3 As part of the retirement plan of Henry Rodd, the
founder of the corporation, the Rodd family caused the corporation
to purchase his forty-five shares. 1
04
The purchase of Henry Rodd's shares took place without the
plaintiff's knowledge. 10 5 Upon learning of the transaction, the
plaintiff brought her shares to the corporation for purchase on the
same terms given Henry Rodd. 10 6 The corporation refused to
purchase the plaintiff's shares. 107 The plaintiff then brought an
action alleging that the controlling shareholders had breached their
fiduciary duty to her as a minority shareholder by causing the
corporation to purchase the stock of Henry Rodd without offering
the same opportunity to her. 108 The Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court agreed, holding that when controlling shareholders
use their position to confer benefits upon themselves, they must
offer the same benefits to the minority shareholders. 0 9 The Rodd
101. See Fix v. Fix Material Co., 538 S.W.2d 351, 358 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (fiduciary concepts
are used in measuring conduct of controlling shareholders, particularly in closely held corporations);
Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 264 Or. 614, -, 507 P.2d 387, 394 (1973)
("oppressive" conduct is closely related to the fiduciary duty of good faith and fair dealing owed to
minority shareholders).
102. 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975).
103. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, -, 328 N.E.2d 505, 519 (1975). The
plaintiff held 50 shares of stock in the closely held corporation with the remaining 198 shares held by
the Rodd family. Id. at __ , 328 N.E.2d at 510.
104. Id. The purchase price of Henry Rodd's shares was set at book and liquidation value. Id.
105. Id. The trial court found that upon learning of the repurchase -the plaintiff did not ratify
the purchase of Henry Rodd's shares. Id. at __ , 328 N.E.2d at 511.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. The trial court approved the transaction in which the corporation repurchased Henry
Rodd's stock, finding that the transaction was fair to the corporation and carried out in good faith.
Id. at __, 328 N.E.2d at 508.
109. Id. at __, 328 N.E.2d at 519. The court held that the controlling group may not, in
violation of their strict fiduciary duty, establish an exclusive market in previously unmarketable
shares if the minority shareholders are excluded from the market. Id. at __ , 328 N.E.2d at 518. In
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family's failure to extend the opportunity for purchase to the
plaintiff constituted a breach of their fiduciary duty. "10
The court's analysis of the duty existing between controlling
shareholders and minority shareholders in a closely held
corporation broke new ground."II The court imposed a standard of
duty equal to the duty existing between partners in a partnership,
which was defined "as the 'utmost good faith and loyalty.'"1 12 The
court explicitly contrasted this standard with the less stringent
standard that directors and shareholders of all corporations must
adhere to in the discharge of their corporate responsibilities. 
11 3
The court believed that the imposition of an enhanced
fiduciary duty was warranted because of the nature of closely held
corporations. 114 First, the court noted that closely held corporations
resemble partnerships.11 5 Just as in a partnership, the relationship
among the shareholders of a closely held corporation must be one of
trust, confidence, and absolute loyalty if the business is to
succeed. 1t 6  Second, the court acknowledged the minority
shareholders' great vulnerability to abuse by the controlling
shareholders." 7 The power of the directors, dominated by the
controlling shareholders, to declare or withhold dividends or to
deny or terminate employment is easily converted into a device of
oppression." 8  Finally, the court recognized the problems of
addition, the court noted that the majority's purchase also distributed corporate assets to the
shareholder whose shares were purchased. Id. The court determined that the purchase of shares from
one member of the controlling group is a "preferential distribution of assets" unless an equal
opportunity is given to all stockholders. Id. at __, 328 N.E.2d at 518-19 (emphasis omitted).
Consequently, the court held that "in any case in which the controlling stockholders have exercised
their power over the corporation to deny the minority such equal opportunity, the minority shall be
entitled to appropriate relief." Id. at-, 328 N.E.2d at 519.
110. Id. at , 328 N.E.2d at 520.
11. See Comment, The Strict Good Faith Standard - Fiduciary Duties to Minority Shareholders in Close
Corporations, 33 MERCER L. REV. 595, 599 (1982). See generally Bulloch, Heightened Fiduciary Duties in
Closely Held Corporations: Donahue Revisited, 16 PAC. L.J. 935 (1985) (discussion of how Donahue
changed the law applicable to close corporations).
112, Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. at -, 328 N.E.2d at 515 (citations
omitted). The court described the duty imposed upon stockholders in a close corporation as follows:
(Sltockholders in the close corporation owe one another substantially the same
fiduciary duty in the operation of the enterprise that partners owe to one another....
[W]e have defined the standard of duty owed by partners to one another as the
"utmost good faith and loyalty." Stockholders in close corporations must discharge
their management and stockholder responsibilities in conformity with this strict good
faith standard. They may not act out of avarice, expediency or self-interest in
derogation of their duty of loyalty to the other stockholders and to the corporation.
Id. (citations omitted).
113. Id. at -, 328 N.E.2d at 515-16. The court stated that directors of general corporations
are held only to a good faith and inherent fairness standard of conduct. Id.
114. Id. at -, 328 N.E.2d at 512.
115. Id.
116. Id.; see supra note 29; Comment, supra note 11, at 600.
117. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. at -. , 328 N.E.2d at 513. The court noted
that the majority may employ a variety of oppressive "freeze-out" devices to which the minority is
vulnerable. Id.
118. Id. For a discussion of freeze-out techniques employed by controlling groups, see supra
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illiquidity that a minority shareholder faces.' 19 The minority
shareholder simply does not have the ability to dispose of her stock
in the marketplace. 1
2 0
Holding controlling shareholders to a standard of strictest
good faith expands the realm of activity that may be characterized
as oppressive. 12 1 A violation of the controlling shareholders'
fiduciary duty allows a minority shareholder to bring a claim of
oppression against the controlling shareholders. Under this
analysis, a minority shareholder need only claim that the
controlling shareholders failed to exercise utmost good faith and
loyalty.
2. Reasonable Expectations Approach
A further refinement of the oppression analysis came about
when courts began to interject the idea of reasonable
expectations. 22 The reasonable expectations approach attempts to
protect a minority shareholder's reasonable expectations of her role
in, and return from, the closely held corporation.The controlling
shareholders frustration of the reasonable expectations of a
minority shareholder may constitute oppression. If it is the
shareholders' intention that all shareholders actively participate in
the management of the corporation, for example, the exclusion
from participation of one of the shareholders may be oppressive. 1
23
The reasonable expectations analysis has been justified by the
highly personal relationships that generally exist between the
shareholders in closely held corporations. 24 Such relationships
suggest that the shareholders in a closely held corporation have
certain reasonable expectations at the inception of the enterprise.
These expectations typically include participation in management
and employment with the corporation. 125 Under this analysis, a
shareholder has a right to obtain relief when she has been
notes 52-59 and accompanying text. See also Bulloch, supra note 11l, at 939-40; Comment, supra note
111, at 600.
119. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. at -, 328 N.E.2d at 514.
120. Id. For a discussion of the plight of minority shareholders in close corporations, see supra
notes 48-51 and accompanying text. See also Bulloch, supra note 11, at 938-39 (no informed person
would purchase a minority shareholder's stock in a close corporation when strained relationships
exist between minority and majority shareholders).
121. See Bulloch, supra note 111, at 935.
122. See O'Neal, supra note 31, at 885. O'Neal defines the reasonable expectations of a
shareholder as the "expectation to participate in management or to be employed by the company."
Id.
123. See id. at 885-88.
124. See id. at 885-86; Peeples, supra note 20, at 501,
125. See O'Neal, supra note 31, at 884-85; Peeples, supra note 20, at 501-02; Note, supra note 30,
at 1010.
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unexpectedly denied future employment and faces a future of little
or no return from an investment which she expected to support
her.' 26 Consideration of the reasonable expectations of a minority
shareholder may shift the court's examination away from the
conduct of the controlling shareholders because such conduct is
arguably irrelevant if a minority shareholder's reasonable
expectations have been frustrated. 12 7 Because of its emphasis on the
expectations of the shareholders, some commentators have argued
that the reasonable expectations approach constitutes the most
reliable guide to ajust solution of disputes between the shareholders
in a closely held corporation. 1
28
In re Topper'29  represents one of the first decisions to
incorporate the reasonable expectations approach to oppression. In
Topper three individuals formed two corporations; each
corporation was to operate a separate pharmacy. 130 Each of the
individuals had a one-third interest in both corporations.' 3' The
petitioner expected to become actively involved in the manage-
ment of the business.' 32 Relying upon his expectations, he
terminated his employment of twenty-five years, moved his family
from Florida to New York, and invested his life's savings in the
venture. 1
33
Less than a year after formation of the corporations, the other
two shareholders discharged the petitioner as an employee,
terminated his salary, and removed him from his position as a
corporate officer.' 34 Because no dividends were being paid, the
petitioner was effectively precluded from obtaining any return on
his investment. 35 The petitioner filed for dissolution, charging that
the controlling shareholders had engaged in oppressive conduct. 1
36
The court concluded that the acts of the controlling
126. See O'Neal, supra note 31, at 887.
127. See Note, supra note 30, at 1011 ; Note, supra note 39, at 533. One student of corporate law
has noted that the reasonable expectations test primarily focuses on the impact upon the minority
shareholders and disregards the oppressive acts of the majority. Note, supra note 30, at 1011. This
approach justifies relief even when the acts of the majority are not wrongful. Id.
128. See O'Neal, supra note 31, at 886 (reasonable expectations of shareholders may be the most
reliable guide in resolving disputes because the close corporation's charter and bylaws seldom reflect
the full business bargain); Peeples, supra note 20, at 501 (the reasonable expectations of shareholders
assume great significance because they "represent the understanding and assumptions that initially
induced the parties to combine efforts").
129. 107 Misc. 2d 25, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980),
130. In reTopper, 107 Misc. 2d 25, -, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359, 361 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980).
131. Id. at 433 N.Y.S.2d at 362.
132. Id. at __,433 N.Y.S.2d at 361.
133. Id. at __, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 361-62. In addition to his investment the petitioner also
executed personal guarantees and promissory notes for his stock interest. Id.
134. Id. at __, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 362. The other shareholders admitted that the petitioner was
the most active member in the corporation. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at __, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 361. In addition to asking the court for dissolution, the
petitioner, in the alternative, asked the court to direct the two controlling shareholders to buy-out his
shares at fair market value. Id.
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shareholders were oppressive because they severely damaged the
petitioner's reasonable expectations and froze-out his interest in the
corporations. 3 7  The court spent little time dismissing the
controlling shareholders' claim that the discharge was justified. 13 8
The court deemed irrelevant the possibility that the discharge may
have been for cause or the result of a valid exercise of business
judgment. 13 9
The court's analysis in Topper has led to a number of decisions
justifying intervention on the basis of a minority shareholder's
reasonable expectations. 140 Subsequent decisions have noted that
oppression arises when the controlling shareholders' conduct
substantially defeats a minority shareholder's expectations that,
objectively viewed, were both reasonable under the circumstances
and central to the minority shareholder's decision to join the
venture. 141
While only a limited number of courts have used the
reasonable expectations approach, several generalizations can be
made. 142 First, the expectations of all parties are relevant, not just
the expectations of the minority shareholder. 143  Second, a
shareholder's expectations will be honored only if they were
disclosed to the other parties, secret expectations are
unenforceable. 144 Third, a shareholder's expectations may include
employment and management participation. 145  Finally,
expectations may change over the life of the enterprise because
137. Id. at __,433 N.Y.S.2d at 362.
138. Id. The controlling shareholders argued that the petitioner had suffered no harm because
his one-third interest in each of the two corporations remained intact and that the discharge of
petitioner was justified. Id.
139. Id. The court in Topper used the following language to explain why the majority
shareholders' conduct was oppressive:
Whether the controlling shareholders discharged petitioner for cause or in their good
business judgment is irrelevant. The court finds that the undisputed understanding of
the parties was such at the time of the formation of the corporation that the
respondents' actions have severely damaged petitioner's reasonable expectations and
constitute a freeze-out of petitioner's interest; consequently, they are deemed to be
"oppressive" within the statutory framework.
Id.
140. See, e.g., In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 64 N.Y.2d 63, 473 N.E.2d 1173, 484 N.Y.S.2d 799
(1984); In re Taines, 111 Misc. 2d 559, 444 N.Y.S.2d 540 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981).
141. See, e.g., In re Wiedy's Furniture Clearance Center, 108 A.D. 2d 81, __, 487 N.Y.S.2d
901,903 (1985).
142. Peeples, supra note 20, at 502.
143. See id.; see also Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 167 N.J. Super. 141, 154-55, 400
A.2d 554, 561-62 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979), aff'd per curiam, 173 N.J. Super. 559, 414 A.2d
994 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980).
144. Peeples, supra note 20, at 502.
145. Id. at 502-03; see supra notes 35-36, 125.
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expectations at the inception of the business may not be the
expectations of the shareholders at a later date. 1
46
The reasonable expectations approach to oppression allows a
court to apply a standard that has no reference to the actions of the
controlling shareholders. 147 The acts of the controlling shareholders
may be both reasonable and made in good faith, but if the acts
frustrate a shareholder's reasonable expectations, oppression and a
right to relief exist. 148 The focus is shifted away from the activities
of the controlling shareholders to the effect of those activities upon
the minority shareholder's reasonable expectations. While such a
shift may be subtle, it has important ramifications.
49
C. STATUTORY GROUNDS FOR RELIEF - RIGHTS AND INTERESTS
In addition to the oppression analysis, a final basis upon which
to justify intervention focuses on the rights and interests of the
minority shareholder. 150 This basis for relief is found in Calif-
ornia and North Carolina statutes, that provide for dissolution
or other remedies upon a showing that relief is
"reasonably necessary for the protection of the rights or interests of
the complaining shareholder. ' ' ' 5  The few cases that have
addressed these statutes suggest that they provide broad relief to a
minority shareholder.'52  The fact that no reference to the
misconduct of the controlling shareholder is required removes a
significant obstacle for the dissatisfied shareholder.' 53  These
statutes lead to an analysis that is remarkably similar to the
reasonable expectations approach to oppression. Under both
approaches, courts may look at how the acts of the controlling
146. Peeples, supra note 20, at 503.
147. Id. at 504. Peeples contends that the lack of a bad faith requirement is the most unique
feature of the reasonable expectation approach. Id.
148. Id.; see also In re Topper, 107 Misc. 2d 25, -, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359. 362 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1980) (cause and business judgment irrelevant when minority shareholder's reasonable expectations
are frustrated).
149. See Peeples, supra note 20, at 504. Peeples contends that "[tihe absence of any bad faith or
fault requirement suggests that the reasonable expectations analysis should prevail over the business
judgment rule.. . [TJhe business judgment rule should not affect a court-ordered dissolution or
buy-out based on a finding that a shareholder's reasonable expectations have been frustrated." Id.
150. See Hillman, supra note 26, at 55-60 (discussion of the "rights of interests" standards of
California and North Carolina, which allow relief to minority shareholders without regard to
misconduct by the majority).
151. CAL. CORP. CODE S 1800(b)(5)(West 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125(a)(4)(1982).
152. See, e.g., Stumpf v. C.E. Stumpf& Sons, 47 Cal. App. 3d 230, 234, 120 Cal. Rptr. 671,
674 (1975) (dissolution may be ordered "when required to assure fairness to minority
shareholders").
153. See Hillman, supra note 26, at 56-57; Note, supra note 30, at 1008.
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shareholders affect a minority shareholder without looking at the
acts themselves. If the effects of an act threaten the rights or
interests of a minority shareholder, both approaches may provide a
basis for relief regardless of the characterization of the act itself. 1
54
Not surprisingly, in North Carolina courts have adopt-
ed a reasonable expectations approach to define the rights and
interests of the shareholder. 155 For example, in Meiselman v
Meiselman156 the court held that a complaining shareholder's
"rights or interests" in a closely held corporation include her
reasonable expectations in the corporation. 157 The result obtained
using this analysis is the same as that obtained by utilizing the
reasonable expectations approach to oppression: if a controlling
shareholder frustrates the expectations of a minority shareholder, a
right to relief exists. 1
58
At a number of different levels, the framework outlined above
justifies a court's intervention into the affairs of a closely held
corporation to protect the minority shareholder. Whether the
intervention is based on equitable grounds or on an existing
statute, a court may characterize the actions of the controlling
shareholders or the effect of those actions upon the minority
shareholders in such a manner as to justify its action.
IV. THE NONINTERVENTION FRAMEWORK
The nonintervention framework is based upon those cases in
which, despite allegations of unfair or oppressive conduct, courts
have refused to intervene in corporate actions and have allowed
controlling shareholders a certain degree of freedom. A powerful
and traditional theme in corporate law is that directors and
controlling shareholders are allowed to exercise great latitude in
their decisionmaking process. Courts have often been loath to
interfere with the internal affairs of a corporation. 159 This
154. Compare In te Topper, 167 Misc. 2d 25, __, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359, 362 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980)
(dissolution for oppression justified when controlling shareholders damage minority shareholder's
reasonable expectations and freeze-out his interest) with Meiselman v. Meiselman, 309 N.C. 279,
__ 307 S.E.2d 551, 562 (1983) (focus of inquiry is on whether "rights and interests" of minority
shareholder need protection under statute authorizing dissolution, not on actions of majority). See
also Note, supra note 30, at 1011 & n. 105.
155. See Meiselman v. Meiselman, 309 N.C. 279, -_, 307 S.E.2d 551, 563 (1983); Lowder v.
All Star Mills, Inc., 75 N.C. App. 233, -, 330 S.E.2d 649, 655 (1985).
156. 309 N.C. 279, 307 S.E.2d 551 (1983).
157. Meiselman v. Meiselman, 309 N.C.279, -, 307 S.E.2d 551, 563 (1983).
158. See supra note 154.
159. See 1 F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 21, 5 3:03. Courts have traditionally allowed
directors and controlling shareholders a high degree of discretion in the declaration of dividends even
though the withholding of dividends is the most common freeze-out technice. Id. § 3:05; see supra
note 55 and accompanying text; see also Coduti v. Hellwig, 127 111. App. 3d 279, __ 469 N.E.2d
220, 226 (1984). The court in Coduti noted that courts are reluctant to interfere with corporate
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reluctance to meddle in the decisions of corporations has arisen
primarily from two sources: the business judgment rule and the
principle of majority rule in corporate management. 160
A. THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
The business judgment rule occupies a sacred position in
corporate law. 161 A common-law principle, the business judgment
rule has been a part of corporate law for at least 150 years. 162 The
rule is uniformly referenced in every distillation of general
corporate law. 163 It remains today a rule of extraordinary impact
and controversy. 1
64
The business judgment rule arose out of a judicial concern
"that persons of reason, intellect, and integrity would not serve as
directors if the law exacted from them a degree of prescience not
possessed by people of ordinary knowledge.' 1 65 The law had to
acknowledge the fallibility of directors and the need to prevent
review of their every business decision. 166 Early formulations of the
decisions concerning the withholding of dividends "unless the withholding is fraudulent,
oppressive, or totally without merit." Id. (quoting Romanik v. Lurie Home Supply Center, Inc.,
105 111. App. 3d 1118, 1134, 435 N.E.2d 712,723(1982)).
160. See 1 F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 21, S 3:03; O'Neal, supra note 31, at 884. Fora
discussion of the business judgment rule and the principle of majority rule, see infra notes 161-195
and accompanying text.
161. Peeples, supra note 20, at 456; see Terrell, Bricks for the Business Judgment Citadel - Recent
Developments in Delaware Corporate Law, 9 DEL. J, CORP. L. 329 (1984) (the bedrock of corporate
governance is the business judgment rule),
162. Arsht, The Businessjudgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93, 93 (1979); see, e.g., Smith
v. Prattville Mfg., 29 Ala. 503 (1857); Hodges v. New England Screw Co., 1 R.I. 312 (1850), aff'don
rehearing, 3 R.I. 9 (1853).
163. Peeples, supra note 20, at 456; see, e.g., W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON CORPORATIONS 537-53 (5th ed. 1980).
164. See generally Cohn, Demise of the Director's Duty of Care: Judicial Avoidance of Standards and
Sanctions Through the Business Judgment Rule, 62 TEX. L. REV. 591 (1983) (discussion of the dominance
of the business judgment rule in duty of care litigation against corporate directors); Pease, Aronson
v. Lewis: When Demand Is Excused and Delaware's Business Judgment Rule, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 39 (1984)
(review of power of independent committees to dismiss derivative action on basis of business
judgment); Terrell, supra note 161 (review of status of business judgment rule).
The power of independent committees to dismiss derivative actions asserted against the
corporation and to have that decision protected by the business judgment rule is a matter of great
import and current controversy. Cohn notes that "[b]ecause a derivative action asserts a corporate
right, the decision whether to pursue such action theoretically belongs to the directors." Cohn,
supra, at 591 n.3. A shareholder bringing such an action must prove that the board of directors,
upon her request, has failed to redress the wrong or that such a request is futile. Id.
Cohn explains that in an effort to reassert a board role, boards form ad hoc litigation committees
composed of nondefendant directors (who may have been appointed to the board especially for such
service) to determine the corporation's response to the derivative actions. Id. Not surprisingly, these
committees generally decide to seek a dismissal of the derivative action. Id. The rising popularity of
such committees has created a good deal of litigation regarding the appropriate judicial standard for
the review of such decisions. Id.; see also Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788 (Del. 1981)
(even if independence and reasonable procedure are proved, court should apply its own business
judgment); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 623-24, 393 N.E.2d 994, 996, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920,
921 (1979) (committee's business judgment to seek dismissal beyond judicial review except for
questions of independence and procedure).
165. Arsht, supra note 162, at 97; see also I F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 21, S 3:03, at
6 (the business judgment rule encourages able and responsible persons to accept corporate office).
166. Arsht, supra note 162, at 95.
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business judgment rule recognized the folly of requiring directors to
exercise perfect judgment. 167 Directors were to be held responsible
for their decisions only upon a showing that their error was of "a
kind so gross that people of common sense and ordinary attention
would not have fallen into it."168
The general idea of the business judgment rule remains as it
was over a hundred years ago: When directors have acted with
reasonable care and in good faith, their decisions will be considered
business judgments and they will not be liable for the consequences
of such judgments. 169 While the general contours of the business
judgment rule have remained static, the specific contests of the rule
are unsettled. For example, one formulation of the rule interprets
it as preventing a court's interference with a business judgment
decision absent "gross and palpable" overreaching. 70 Another
formulation provides that the judgment of the directors will not be
disturbed if it can be attributed to any rational business purpose. '7'
The Delaware Supreme Court, the prime developer of the
various forms of the business judgment rule, recently attempted a
restatement of the rule in Aronson v. Lewis. 172 In Aronson the court
wrote:
[The business judgment rule] is a presumption that in
making a business decision the directors of a corporation
acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the
honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests
of the company. Absent an abuse of discretion, that
judgment will be respected by the courts. 173
The court noted that the business judgment rule does not apply if
the directors were "interested" or lacked independence, 7 4 failed to
167. See, e.g., Godbold v. Branch Bank, 11 Ala. 191, 199 (1847); Percy v. Millaudon, 8 Mart.
(n.s.) 68, 77-78 (La. 1829).
168. Arsht, supra note 162, at 97-99 (quoting Percy v. Millaudon, 8 Mart. (n.s.) 68, 78 (La.
1829)).
169. Compare Manning, The BusinessJudgment Rule In Overview, 45 OHIo ST. L.J. 615, 617 (1984)
(when a board of cirectors has acted with reasonable care and i good faith, its decisions will be
regarded as business judgments and the directors will not be liable for damages, even when a
decision proves to be detrimental to the corporation) with Hodges v. New England Screw Co., 3 R.I.
9, 18 (1853) ("a board of directors acting in good faith and with reasonable care and diligence, who
neve theless fall into a tnistake, either as to law or fact, arc not liable tor the consequences of such a
mtistake"), qff'g on rehearing, I R.I. 312 (1850)..
170. See, e.g., Getty Oil Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 267 A.2d 883, 887 (Del. 1970); Meyerson v. El
Paso Natural Gas Co., 246 A.2d 789, 794 (Del. 1967).
171. See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 721-22 (Del. i971).
172. 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
173. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (citations omitted). The court in Aronson
surveyed a long line of Delaware cases attempting to define the parameters of the business judgment
rule and acknowledged the imprecision of the rule's definition. See id.
174. Id. The court noted that "interest" means that directors cannot appear on both sides of a
transaction. Id. In addition, they cannot expect to obtain any personal financial benefits through self-
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inform themselves of all available material information, 17 5 or failed
to act with requisite care in the discharge of their duties.
176
Requisite care is predicated on the standard of gross negligence. 1
77
When a decision of the directors or controlling shareholders is
challenged by a shareholder, the directors and controlling
shareholders invariably invoke the protection of the business
judgment rule.' 78 Many courts have interpreted the rule as limiting
judicial review of business decisions and requiring a policy of
deference to the decisions of directors and controlling
shareholders. 179 By invoking the business judgment rule, directors
and controlling shareholders attempt to keep the reasons for, and
the fairness of their decisions and actions immune from review.
B. THE PRINCIPLE OF MAJORITY RULE
Courts have also used the concept of majority rule, although
less explicitly than the business judgment rule, to justify a policy of
nonintervention into corporate decisions.180  Generally, a
corporation operates under the principle of majority rule. Under
this principle, the holders of a majority of the shares control the
corporation and elect the majority of the board of directors.181 As a
general proposition, directors are responsive to the wishes of the
dealing as opposed to benefits that devolve upon the corporation or all of the stockholders generally.
Jd.;see also I F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 21, § 3:03, at 6 (business judgment rule "does
not apply if the directors are on both sides of a transaction in a self-dealing situation").
175. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d at 812; see also Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del.
1985). In Smith the court noted that the business judgment rule does not protect directors who have
made .'an unintelligent or unadvised judgment.' - Id. (quoting Mitchell v. Highland-W. Glass,
19 Del. Ch. 326, __ , 167 A. 831, 833 (1933)). The court also noted that a director's duty to
inform himself "derives from the fiduciary capacity in which he serves the corporation and its
stockholders." Id.
176. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d at 812; see also Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872-73 (a
director's duty to exercise an informed business judgment is in the nature of a duty of care, not
loyalty).
177. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d at 812 &n.6.
178. See, e.g., id. at 805, 810; Coduti v. Hellwig, 127 I11. App. 3d 279,__, 469 N.E.2d 220,
226(1984); InreTopper, 107 Misc. 2d 25, __ 433 N.Y.S.2d 359, 361 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980).
179. See Puma v. Marriott, 283 A.2d 693, 696 (Del. Ch. 1971) (courts precluded from
substituting their uninformed opinion); Coduti v. Hellwig, 127 Il. App. 3d 279, -, 469 N.E.2d
220, 226 (1984) (courts reluctant to interfere); Mountain Manor Realty, Inc. v. Buccheri, 55 Md.
App. 185, __, 461 A.2d 45, 50 (1983) (courts may not second guess business decisions); Auerbach
v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, __, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 926 (1979) (courts ill-
equipped to evaluate business judgments); I F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 21, § 3:03, at 5
("ithe business judgment rule embodies a broad judicial deference to a corporation's board of
directors to determine business policy and to conduct corporate affairs").
180. See2 F. O'NEAL & R. THoMPsoN, supra note 21, § 10:04; O'Neal, supra note 31, at 884; see
also Hand v. Dexter, 41 Ga. 454, 462 (1871) ("[t]he very foundation principle of a corporation is
that a majority of its stockholders have a right to manage its affairs"): Coduti v. Hellwig, 127 Ill.
App. 3d 279, -. , 469 N.E.2d 220, 229 (1984) (the majority of the corporation's stockholders
controls the policy of the corporation).
181. 1 F. O'NEAL& R. THOMPSON, supra note 2 1, § 1:02.
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shareholders who elect them.1 82  Normally, in closely held
corporations the majority of directors are in fact the controlling
shareholders. 
1 83
The concept of majority rule operates at two levels. First, it
validates the exercise of the business judgment of the directors and
controlling shareholders. Because the directors have been elected
by a majority of the shareholders, their business judgment should
be accorded respect. This view is represented by a New York
Supreme Court's decision in Alpert v. 28 William Street Corp.1 84 In
Alpert minority shareholders brought an action challenging the
merger and dissolution of a corporation.' 8 5 The court immediately
recognized that the actions complained of were taken by directors
elected by a majority of the shareholders and noted:
Under the law, corporate directors elected by a
majority of shareholders, are accorded a great deal of
leeway in their dealings with the corporation. The courts
generally have adopted the view that any actions taken by
directors which can be considered a proper exercise of
business judgment are not to be reviewed in the
courtroom. The forum for such consideration is the
boardroom. 1
86
The notion is that a person who becomes a shareholder in a
corporation assents to rule by the majority of shareholders and
implicitly agrees to abide by the business decisions of the
majority.' 87  The concept of majority rule brings a further
182. Id. The principle of majority rule has been modified somewhat by statutes that require the
favorable vote of two-thirds of the shareholders for certain fundamental corporate acts. See, e.g.,
N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-05 (1985) (retaining the requirement of a two-thirds majority vote
absent provision to the contrary in the articles of incorporation).
183. 1 1. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 21, S 1:02, at 3 ("in most closely held
corpo ations, majority shareholders elect themselves and their relatives to all or most of the positions
on the board").
184. 124 Misc. 2d 512, 478 N.Y.S.2d 443 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983).
185. Alpert v. 28 William St. Corp., 124 Misc. 2d 512, -, 478 N.Y.S.2d 443, 446 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1983). The minority shareholders alleged that the proposed merger and dissolution was
unfair and motivated by self-interest. Id. The merger plan was to buy out the minority shares at the
same price paid for the majority shares and then dissolve the corporation for the purpose of accruing
benefits to the majority shareholders. Id.
186. Id. The court noted that there was no claim of fraud or gross illegality on the part of the
directors of the corporation. Id.
187. Coduti v. Hellwig, 127 11. App. 3d 279, __, 469 NE.2d 220, 229 (1984). The court in
Coduti described the concept of majority rule as follows:
Every one purchasing or subscribing for stock in a corporation impiiedly agrees that he
will be bound by the acts and proceedings done or sanctioned by a majority of the
shareholders, or by the agents of the corporation duly chosen by such majority, within
the scope of the powers conferred by the charter, and courts of equity will not
undertake to control the policy or business methods of a corporation, although it may
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legitimacy to the controlling shareholders' exercise of business
judgment and thus strengthens the judicial view that it is
inappropriate to interfere with corporate decisions.
Second, the concept of majority rule allows directors and
controlling shareholders additional freedom to engage in certain
types of behavior. 88 This additional freedom has been termed the
rights of "selfish ownership.' 1 89 In Alpert the court discussed the
existence of "selfish ownership" rights and determined that self
interest does not necessarily undermine the validity of business
decisions made by the directors.190 This is a recognition by some
courts that directors and controlling shareholders have a right to
take certain actions that in other circumstances might be
questioned. Self interest on the part of directors and controlling
shareholders is normal and does not undermine the validity of
business decisions. 191 This view strengthens the protections of the
business judgment rule. While courts have often stated that proof of
self interest will allow a court to inquire into a corporate decision, 1
92
judicial review of certain corporate decisions is inhibited by the
recognition that directors and controlling shareholders exercise
some self interest in the normal course of events. 
93
be seen that a wiser policy might be adopted and the business more successful if other
methods were pursued.
Id. (quoting Wheeler v. Pullman Iron & Steel Co., 143 Ill. 197,207, 32 N.E. 420, 423 (1892)); see also
Benton v. United States, 114 F. Supp. 37, 45 (M.D. Ga. 1953) ("when a person becomes a
stockholder in a corporation, he assents to majority rule and impliedly agrees to abide thereby").
188. See 1 F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 21, § 3:03. The authors note that majority
shareholders elect the directors of the corporation who in turn select the officers and employees, fix
compensation for themselves, determine business policies, and manage the corporation. Id. § 3:03,
at 5. The minority shareholders and directors are subject to the "grace or acquiescence" of the
majority shareholders. Id.; see also Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Coin. Shows v. Ringling, 29
Del. Ch. 610, __, 53 A. 2d 441, 447 (1947) (shareholders may vote for personal profit).
189. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842, -, 353 N.E.2d 657, 663
(1976). The court in Wilkes noted that the majority's right of'"selfish ownership" in the corporation
should be balanced against their fiduciary obligation to the minority. Id. at __, 353 N.E.2d at 663.
See generally Hill, The Sale of Controlling Shares, 70 HARV. L. REV. 986, 1013-15 (1957) (discussion of
the concept of"selfish ownership").
190. Afpert v. 28 William St. Corp., 124 Misc. 2d 512, __, 478 N.Y.S.2d 443, 448-49 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1983). The court in Alpert described the rights of"selfish ownership" as follows:
Self-interest is not, under our economic system, a crime. It does not, in and of
itself, undermine the validity of a whole host of business transactions. To state
otherwise would require all our corporate directors to be self-denying, vestal virgins
who would never consider the possibility of any action ever redounding to their own
benefit.
Such selfless dedication may be appropriate for monastic life; it is not appropriate
for business life in twentieth century America.
Id.
191. See I F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 21, § 3 :03 .
192. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (business judgment rule protects
only disinterested directors whose conduct meets the tests of business judgment); Sinclair Oil Corp.
v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (directors may not appear on both sides of a transaction nor
derive any self-dealing financial benefit).
193. See, e.g., Jackson v. St. Regis Apartments, Inc., 565 S.W.2d 178, 183 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978)
(shares of stock are private property and generally may be voted in any manner the owner sees fit);
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C. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR NONINTERVENTION
The business judgment rule and the principle of majority rule
offer a strong defense to directors and controlling shareholders.
These two concepts have been used to justify a strong presumption
that courts will not normally inquire into the decisions of a
corporation. 194 As reflected in countless decisions, many courts feel
incapable of exercising the judgment that they believe more
properly belongs in the hands of the directors and controlling
shareholders. These courts believe that the directors and
controlling shareholders have a right to operate their business in the
manner they feel is in the corporation's best interests, and that the
directors and controlling shareholders are in the best position to
decide what those best interests are. 
195
Given this framework of protection for the decisions of
directors and controlling shareholders, it is not surprising that
minority shareholders have often had a difficult time obtaining
relief from corporate actions that they claimed were unfair or
oppressive. Regardless of the grounds upon which minority
shareholders have requested relief, some courts invariably view the
business judgment rule and the principle of majority rule as
preventing full judicial review of a corporate decision. 196 Even
when courts have not explicitly focused on these rules, various
reasons have been employed to uphold the actions of directors and
controlling shareholders. 197
1. A bsent Statutory A uthority
Traditionally, the first obstacle for a shareholder seeking relief
Alpert v. 28 William St. Corp., 124 Misc. 2d 512, -, 478 N.Y.S.2d 443, 448 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1983) (self-interest does not, in and of itself, undermine the validity of a corporate business
transaction).
194. See I F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 21, § 3:03; see also Wilkes v. Springside
Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842, -, 353 N.E.2d 657, 662 (1976). In Wilkes the court noted
that "freeze-out" techniques in close corporations have been successful because courts consistently
decline to interfere with internal corporate operations. Id. The court stated that these internal
operations involve management decisions subject to the principle of majority rule. Id.
195. See, e.g., Alaska Plastics, Inc. v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270, 278 (Alaska 1980) (courts are
reluctant to substitute their judgment for that of the board of directors absent unequal distribution
of benefits among shareholders); Mountain Manor Realty, Inc. v. Buccheri, 55 Md. App. 185,
__ 461 A.2d 45, 50 (1983) (general rule is that a court may not interfere with or second-guess
business decisions made by controlling shareholders).
196. See cases cited supra note 195.
197. 1 F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 21, § 3:03. The authors contend that many courts
apparently recognize a legitimate sphere of self-interested actions by controlling shareholders even if
the minority suffers. Id.; see also Fix v. Fix Material Co., 538 S.W.2d 351, 361 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976)
(even though substantial evidence of oppressive and illegal conduct on the part of controlling
shareholder existed, such evidence was insufficient to warrant dissolution); Baker v. Commercial
Body Builders, Inc., 264 Or. 614, __, 507 P.2d 387, 394 (1973) (even a continuing course of
"oppressive" conduct may not be sufficient for dissolution unless such conduct results in a
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was the lack of a statute providing for relief. 198 As noted earlier, the
general rule at common law was that, absent statutory authority,
courts had no jurisdiction to grant dissolution at the request of a
minority shareholder. 199 With few statutes providing for dissolution
or other relief at the request of a shareholder, intervention by courts
was rare. 200 Courts allowed directors and controlling shareholders
to exercise their judgment by default. In the few cases that courts
recognized an equitable basis for intervention into a corporation's
affairs, relief was limited. Courts often required a showing that the
directors or controlling shareholders had engaged in fraudulent or
illegal acts, or that the ruin of the corporation was imminent. 0 1
2. Within the Oppression Analysis
When oppression became a more widely recognized basis for
relief,202 many courts were just as unwilling to intervene as they
had been under earlier rationales. For example, in Jackson v. St.
Regis Apartments, Inc., 20 3 the minority shareholders brought suit
against the controlling shareholders alleging oppression of their
interests and rights. 20 4 The shareholders were tenants of an
apartment building who had formed a corporation to purchase the
building and operate it as a cooperative. 20 5 A nonuniform fee
structure was imposed for the payment of services. 20 6 The minority
shareholders argued that the imposition of an unequal fee structure
for services that each shareholder shared equally was illegal and
oppressive.2 0 7 The trial court agreed and held for the minority
disproportionate loss to minority shareholders, or unless controlling shareholders cannot be trusted
to manage fairly in stockholders' interests).
198. See Hillman, supra note 26, at 38 n. 120; Note, supra note 39, at 513-19.
199. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
200. West Virginia did have a dissolution statute as early as 1868. See W. VA. CoDE 5 53-57
(1868) (current version at W. VA. CODE § 31-1-134 (1982)). However, it was not until 1933 in Illinois
that oppression became a standard for relief. See supra note 85. Without statutory authorization,
courts were reluctant to offer relief even in the face of abusive conduct by those in control of the
corporation. See Hillman, supra note 26, at 38; Note, supra note 30, at 1005-06 & n.57; see, e.g.,
Hardon v. Newton, 11 F. Cas. 500, 501 (D. Conn. 1878) (No. 6054).
201. See, e.g., Dixie Lumber Co. v. Hellams, 202 Ala. 488, -, 80 So. 872, 874 (1919);
Phinizy v. Anniston City Land Co., 195 Ala. 656, -, 71 So. 469, 471 (1916); Manufacturers'
Land & Improvement Co. v. Cleary, 121 Ky. 403, -, 89 S.W. 248, 249 (1905); James F.
Powers Foundry Co. v. Miller, 166 Md. 590, __, 171 A. 842, 845 (1934).
202. The Illinois legislation led to the adoption of the oppression standard by numerous other
states. For a partial listing of states that have incorporated the oppression standard into dissolution
statutes, see supra note 86.
203. 565 S.W.2d 178 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
204. Jackson v. St. Regis Apartments, Inc., 565 S.W.2d 178, 180 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 180-81. The board of directors had imposed a nonuniform fee structure for the
payment of services provided to the shareholder-occupants despite the fact that each shareholder-
occupant received equal services. Id.
207. Id. at 181. The minority shareholders testified that they were informed of the amount of the




shareholders. 20 8 The Missouri Court of Appeals reversed, noting
that shares of stock are private property and generally may be voted
in any manner the owner sees fit. 20 9 The court held that absent
fraud, it was not appropriate for a court to substitute its judgment
concerning the proper management of the corporation.
210
The court's decision in Jackson invoked the pillars of the
nonintervention framework. With respect to the business judgment
rule, the court noted that errors of judgment should not be
reviewed. 2 1 1 Regarding the principle of majority rule, the court
explained that shareholders may vote their shares as they see fit.
2 12
The court's recognition of the business judgment rule and the right
of controlling shareholders to control the corporation led to its
decision to reverse the trial court's finding of oppression without
engaging in an extensive discussion of what acts might have
constituted oppressive behavior. The nonintervention framework
limited the court's inquiry.
Even when courts took a closer look at what type of behavior
constituted oppression, if they were unwilling to intervene they
quickly invoked the business judgment rule and the principle of
majority rule as justifications for their nonintervention.2 13 A
striking example of this approach is illustrated by the decision in
Coduti v. Hellwig.2 14 In Coduti a minority shareholder brought an
action alleging that the controlling shareholders had engaged in a
variety of oppressive acts including, among other things, a refusal
to authorize dividends and wasting and misapplying corporate
assets.21 5 The court acknowledged that oppression might result
208. Id. at 180-81. The trial court found that no evidence explained orjustified the variance in
fees for services that were the same for each apartment unit. Id. at 181. The trial court held that the
imposition of the service fee structure constituted oppression because it was so arbitrary and
inequitable that it was a breach of the majority's fiduciary duty. Id.
209. Id. at 183. The appellate court injackson determined that the complaining shareholders had
ratified the staggered service fee because the fee was embodied in the corporation's bylaws. Id.
210. Id. The court in Jackson used the following language to describe the discretion permitted
controlling groups in a corporation:
"[Clourts of equity will not, as a general rule, exercise jurisdiction to control or
interfere in the management of the corporate or internal affairs of the corporation. The
court has no power to interpose its authority for the purpose of adjusting controversies
relative to the proper mode of conducting the corporate business. Errors of judgment
on the part of the officers are not grounds for the interference of equity. For the court
to intervene there must be actual or threatened acts which are ultra vires, fraudulent,
and injurious, and are an abusive [sic] power, and are acts of oppression on the part of
the Corporation of sic] its officers.'
Id. (quotingGolden v. St.Joseph Milk Producers' Ass'n, 420 S.A.2d 31,33 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967)).
211. Id. at 183.
212. Id.
213. See, e.g-, Coduti v. Hellwig, 127 I111 App. 3d 279, 469 N.E.2d 220(1984).
214. 127 111. App. 3d 279, 469 N.E.2d 220(1984).
215. Coduti v. Hellwig, 127 Il1. App. 3d 279, .469 N. E.2d 220, 225 (1984). Coduti sought
dissolution of the corporation and an accounting of the controlling shareholders for improper benefits
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from behavior that was "arbitrary, overbearing and heavy-
handed."216  However, in refusing to grant the minority
shareholder any relief, the court relied significantly on the
principles of business judgment and majority rule. The court
reasoned that the matters which the minority shareholders
complained of were matters of business judgment, within the
discretion of the board of directors, and with which the court
would not concern itself. 21 7  Further, the court noted that the
controlling shareholders were permitted to control the business of
the corporation.2" 8  The court reasoned that the minority
shareholders had implicitly agreed that they would be bound by
the acts of the controlling shareholders and a dissatisfaction with
those acts was an insufficient basis upon which to justify
intervention.
21 9
Courts utilizing the nonintervention framework have agreed
that oppressive conduct is something less than fraudulent or
illegal conduct. 220 Beyond that, however, there is little common
ground concerning the definition of "oppression. ' 2 21' The
flexibility of the definition allowed courts an equal amount of
flexibility in characterizing actions of controlling shareholders as
not oppressive. In Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc. 22 2 the
controlling shareholders discharged the minority shareholders from
received from the corporation. Id. at __ , 469 N.E.2d at 223. Coduti alleged that Hellwig, the
majority shareholder, refused to authorize bonuses or dividends despite large corporate case
reserves, refused to allow Coduti's attorney to attend directors' meetings, held directors' meetings
without notice to Coduti, caused the arrest of Coduti, opened his mail, and degraded him in the
presence of others. Id. at __, 469 N.E.2d at 225.
216. Id. The court in Coduti examined a variety of conduct that had or had not been regarded as
oppressive. Id. However, the court noted that "a review of the case law discloses no single act,
which, by itself, will be deemed oppressive without consideration of the surrounding
circumstances." Id. Thus, the court stated that oppression must be determined in light of the facts of
each case. Id.
217. Id. at -, 469 N.E.2d at 226, 229. The court first addressed whether Hellwig's refusal to
authorize bonuses or dividends while the corporation amassed large reserves constituted oppression.
Id. at __, 469 N.E.2d at 226. The court stated that when funds are available decisions concerning
dividend declarations rest within the discretion of the board, and courts are reluctant to interfere "
'unless the withholding is fraudulent, oppressive or totally without merit.' " Id. (quoting Romanik v.
Lurie Home Supply Center, Inc., 105 Ill. App. 3d 1118, 1134, 435 N.E.2d 712, 723 (1982)). The
court also determined that Hellwig's decision to pay membership dues in advance was a matter of
business judgment and the responsibility of the board ofdirectors, not the concern of the court. Id. at
__, 469 N.E.2d at 229.
218. Id. at __,469 N.E.2d at 229.
219. Id. at_, 469 N.E.2d at 229-30 (quoting Wheeler v. Pullman Iron &Steel Co., 143 I11.
197, 207, 32 N.E.420, 423 (1892). For a discussion of the principle of majority rule, see supra notes
180-93 and accompanying text.
220. See, e.g., Gidwitz v. Lanzit Corrugated Box Co., 20 Ill. 2d 208, 214-15, 170 N.E.2d 131,
135 (1960) (oppression is not synonymous with illegal and fraudulent); Fix v. Fix Material Co., 538
S.W. 2d 351, 357-58 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (oppression is "an independent ground for relief not
requiring a showing of fraud, illegality, mismanagement, wasting of assets, nor deadlock, though
these factors are frequently present").
221. See Coduti v. Hellwig, 127 I11. App. 3d 279, .., 469 N.E.2d 220, 225 (1984) (no single
act is deemed oppressive without consideration of the surrounding circumstances); see also Hillman,
supra note 26, at 45, 49; Note, supra note 39, at 520.
222. 264 Or. 614, 507 P.2d 387 (1973).
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employment, removed the minority shareholders as directors,
failed to notify them of meetings, falsified corporate records to
indicate that the minority shareholders had been notified of or were
present at such meetings, denied them access to corporate records,
and advanced corporate funds to another company in which one of
the controlling shareholders held an interest. 223  Despite the
existence of a broad definition of oppression, 224 the court held that
relief was unwarranted.2 25 Apparently, the fact that the acts of the
controlling shareholders had occurred over a one year period and
had not continued was reason enough to deny relief to the minority
shareholders. 226
Other applications and interpretations of oppression allowed
courts to characterize the acts of the controlling shareholders in a
manner that denied minority shareholders relief. Some courts
required a continuing series of oppressive acts, relief being justified
only upon an accumulation of such acts. 227 Other courts, while
recognizing oppression as an independent ground for relief that did
not require a showing of fraud or illegality, acknowledged that
fraudulent or illegal conduct was often present as well. 228 Courts
frequently characterized the acts of controlling shareholders as not
oppressive because of this difficulty in addressing oppression as an
independent source of relief.
3. Within the Fiduciary Duty/Reasonable Expectations Analysis
When courts refined the definition of oppression by
incorporating the concepts of fiduciary duty and reasonable
expectations, the nonintervention framework provided a response.
223. Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 264 Or. 614, -, 507 P.2d 387, 396 (1973).
224. Id. at __ , 507 P.2d at 393-94. The court defined "oppressive conduct" as follows:
" '[Bjurdensome, harsh and wrongful conduct; a lack of probity and fair dealing in
the affai! , of a company to the prejudice of some of its members; or a visual departure
from the standards of fair dealing, and a violation of fair play on which every
shareholder who entrusts his money to a company is entitled to rely.' "
Id (quoting Scottish Co-op. Wholesale Soc'y Ltd. v. Meyer, [1958] 3 All E.R. 66, 71, 86 (H.L.)
and Elder v. Elder& Watson, Ltd., I19521 Sess. Cas. 49, 55).
225. Id. at __, 507 P.2d at 398. The court determined that granting dissolution could destroy
the assets of the corporation, result in a return to the shareholders of much less than the book value of
their stock, and be very costly. Id. Consequently, the court held that although some of the conduct of
the majority shareholders was "oppressive," that alone did not justify relief. Id.
226. Id. Baker represents a traditional approach under which severe misconduct is required for a
finding of oppression, despite the court's broad definition of oppression. Hillman, supra note 26, at
45.
227. See, e.g., Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 264 Or. 614, _ 507 P.2d 387, 394
(1973) (even a continuing course of "oppressive" conduct may not be sufficient for dissolution
absent incorrigible conduct or a disproportionate loss to the minority).
228. See, e.g., Fix v. Fix Material Co., 538 S.W.2d 351, 358 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (although
oppression suggests "burdensome, harsh and wrongful conduct," these are merely perimeters of the
broad term, not narrow definitions that rob the term of its flexibility).
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While some courts recognized the existence of an enhanced
fiduciary duty, 229 others were reluctant to apply the concept
without the limiting principles of business judgment and majority
rule.230 In Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 231 the court was
concerned that untempered application of the strict good faith
standard would "result in the imposition of limitations on
legitimate action by the controlling group.' '232 The court felt that
such limitations would unduly hamper the controlling group's
effectiveness in managing the corporation in the best interests of all
concerned. 233 The court stated that the majority has rights to
"selfish ownership" which must be balanced against their fiduciary
obligation to the minority. 234 In addition, the court acknowledged
that the controlling group must have broad discretion in
establishing the business policy of the corporation.
235
Some courts have recognized this need for discretion and
refused to provide relief to complaining shareholders despite the
court's acknowledgment of a fiduciary duty.23 6 In the companion
cases of Zidell v. Zidell, Inc.,2 37 a minority shareholder sued to
compel payment of dividends238 and to require the controlling
shareholder to transfer stock to the corporation. 239 The court
recognized that the controlling group owed a fiduciary duty to the
minority shareholders.2 40 Yet despite undisputed hostility between
the controlling and minority shareholders, and concededly
229. See, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, , 328 N.E.2d 505, 515
(1975). For a discussion of the enhanced fiduciary duty recognized in Donahue, see supra note 112.
230. See, e.g., Coduti v. Hellwig, 127 Il1. App. 3d 279, -, 469 N.E.2d 220, 229-30 (1984);
Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842, __, 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (1976).
231. 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657 (1976).




235. Id. The court noted that the actions of the controlling shareholders in a close corporation
must be analyzed individually in every case alleging a breach of the strict good faith
duty. Id. In each case, the controlling shareholders must demonstrate a legitimate business purpose
for their actions. Id. However, the court noted that the controlling shareholders must have discretion
in establishing the business policy of the corporation and that this may be used to show a legitimate
business purpose for their actions. Id. The court stated the scope of the controlling group's discretion
as follows:
i'rhe controlling group] must have a large measure of discretion, for example, in
declaring or withholding dividends, deciding whether to merge or consolidate,
establishing the salaries of corporate officers, dismissing directors with or without
cause, and hiring and firing corporate employees.
Id.
236. See, e.g., Zidell v. Zidell, Inc., 277 Or. 413, 560 P.2d 1086 (1977); Zidell v. Zidell, Inc.,
277 Or. 423, 560 P.2d 1091 (1977) (companion cases).
237. 277 Or. 413, 560 P.2d 1086 (1977); 277 Or. 423, 560 P.2d 1091 (1977).
238. Zidell v. Zidell, Inc., 277 Or. 413, __, 560 P.2d 1086, 1087 (1977) (dividend case).
239. Zidell v. Zidell, Inc., 277 Or. 423, __, 560 P.2d 1091, 1091 (1977) (transfer case).
240. Zidell v. Zidell, Inc., 277 Or. at __ , 560 P.2d at 1089; Zidell v. Zidell, Inc., 277 Or. at
__, 560 P.2d at 1094.
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generous salaries and bonuses for shareholder employees 2 41 the
court held that the minority shareholder had no right to relief. 42
The court not only recognized the corporation's need to tailor its
policies as it saw fit, but also noted that the minority shareholder
was no different than any minority shareholder who had no larger
voice in corporate affairs than her percentage of stock ownership. 2
43
A corporation's need to exercise its business judgment and the right
of controlling shareholders to control the corporation justified the
court's refusal to intervene.
244
The nonintervention framework justified limitation of the
reasonable expectations approach as well, whether that approach
was through the oppression standard or the rights and interests
statutes. While some courts have applied the reasonable
expectations approach, 245 others have recognized the need to allow
corporate decisionmakers some discretion in their
decisionmaking. 246 In Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 24 7 a
minority shareholder brought suit against the controlling
shareholders alleging that the controlling shareholders had engaged
in oppressive conduct by violating his reasonable expectations.24 8
Apparently, the minority shareholder had an expectation that he
would be employed by the corporation and that he would
participate in the management of the corporation. 249 After having
been employed for a period of time, the minority shareholder was
discharged.2
50
While acknowledging that the business judgment rule had
often been used to justify oppressive conduct, the court allowed the
controlling shareholders to discharge the minority shareholder. 251
241. Zidell v. Zidell, Inc., 277 Or. at__ , 560 P.2d at 1089.
242. Id. at-., 560 P.2d at 1090; Zidell v. Zidell, Inc., 277 Or. at-, 560 P.2d at 1095.
243. Zidell v. Zidell, Inc., 277 Or. at-., 560 P.2d at 1094-95.
244. Zidell v. Zidell, Inc., 277 Or. at __, 560 P.2d at 1089-90; Zidell v. Zidell, Inc., 277 Or.
at , 560 P.2d at 1094-95.
245. For a discussion of the reasonable expectations approach, see supra notes 122-49 and
accompanying text.
246. See, e.g., Capitol Toyota, Inc. v. Gervin, 381 So. 2d 1038 (Miss. 1980); Exadaktilos v.
Cinnaminson Realty Co., 167 N.J. Super. 141, 400 A.2d 554 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979), aff'd
per curiam, 173 NJ. Super. 559, 414 A.2d 994 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980); see also Note, supra
note 39, at 533-34.
247. 167 N.J. Super. 141, 400 A.2d 554 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979), aff'd per curiam, 173
NJ. Super. 559, 414 A.2d 994 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980).
248. Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 167 N.J. Super. 141, -, 400 A.2d 554, 556-61
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979), aff'dper curiam, 173 NJ. Super. 559, 414 A.2d 994 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1980). In Exadaktilos a stock certificate representing 20% of the interest in a
corporation was given to the plaintiff. Id. at -, 400 A.2d at 556. The small corporation operated a
restaurant. Id. at __, 400 A.2d at 561. The plaintiff's reasonable expectations included a salary
and eventual participation in management. Id. The defendants introduced evidence indicating that
the plaintiff's expectations were thwarted by his own failure to learn the business, which was a
condition precedent to participation in the corporation. Id. at__ , 400 A.2d at 561-62.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 400 A.2d at 561.
251. Id. at 400 A.2d at 561-62. The court noted that the business judgment rule does not
allow judicial tampering with board of director decisions concerning corporate affairs so long as the
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The court explained that the minority shareholder had been
discharged because of his unsatisfactory performance and that his
expectations of employment and management participation were
thwarted by his own conduct. 252 The minority shareholder's
conduct allowed the court to uphold the controlling shareholders'
exercise of judgment despite its frustration of the minority
shareholder's reasonable expectations. 25 3  Within the
nonintervention framework, the reasonable expectations of a
shareholder are not allowed to dictate whether relief is available. A
court may look beyond the effect that the controlling shareholders'
acts have on the minority shareholder to the reasons for those acts.
Those reasons may justify frustration of a shareholder's reasonable
expectations.
The above cases set out a framework that protects the decisions
of directors and controlling shareholders. In this framework,
minority shareholders have a difficult time obtaining relief. Courts
defer to the expertise of the directors and controlling shareholders
and allow them to make business judgments. Courts allow
controlling shareholders to control the corporation. The framework
provides the arguments that directors and controlling shareholders
may use to immunize their decisions from extensive judicial review.
Utilizing this framework, a court can justify its refusal to intervene.
V. THE NORTH DAKOTA INVOLUNTARY
DISSOLUTION STATUTE
The frameworks discussed above provide a structure within
which to analyze North Dakota's new involuntary dissolution
statute, embodied in section 10-19.1-115 of the North Dakota
Century Code.2 54 The statute's provisions look very different
depending on the framework applied. The provisions of subsection
10-19.1-115(1)(b)(2) allow a shareholder to proceed against the
corporation when the directors or those in control have acted
fraudulently, illegally, or in a manner unfairly prejudicial toward
decision is within the scope of their authority and there is no showing of bad faith. Id. at __, 400
A.2d at 559.
252. Id. at -_, 400 A.2d at 561-62. In Exadaktilos the evidence showed that the plaintiff had
caused the loss of key personnel by failing to get along with them, that he had quit several times
without reason or notice, and that he was incompatible with the other shareholders. Id. at __, 400
A.2d at 561. The court determined that the plaintiff was discharged because of his failure to learn the
business and his unsatisfactory performance. Id.
253. See id. at __, 400 A.2d at 561-62; see also Capitol Toyota, Inc. v. Gervin, 381 So. 2d 1038,
1039 (Miss. 1980) (although the minority shareholder's reasonable expectations were frustrated by
his discharge, his inadequate management of the corporation justified denying dissolution).
254. See supra notes 3, 12-15 and accompanying text. For the full text and a discussion of the
North Dakota involuntary dissolution statute, see supra notes 3, 12-15 and accompanying text.
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the shareholder. 25 5  To guide the court's application of the
provision, the legislature has indicated in subsection 10-19.1-
115(3) that a court should consider both the duty that shareholders
in a closely held corporation owe one another to act in an honest,
fair, and reasonable manner, and the shareholders' reasonable
expectations. 256 The statute sets out language from the intervention
framework. It requires a court to consider the fiduciary duty
existing between controlling shareholders and minority
shareholders and the reasonable expectations of the shareholders.
2 57
The nonintervention framework provides a response to each of
these standards. 2 58  The analysis of the statute lies in an
examination of these standards and their responses.
The provisions of section 10-19.1-115 are identical to
provisions in Minnesota's involuntary dissolution statute .259
Minnesota's provisions were adopted in 1983 when the Minnesota
Legislature amended its involuntary dissolution statute. 260 The
legislature intended that the amendments provide a broader basis
for intervention. 261 Reference to the Minnesota statute and its
background may help explain and predict the impact of the North
Dakota provisions.
Initially, the North Dakota involuntary dissolution statute
provides that "unfairly prejudicial" conduct will justify equitable
relief or dissolution.2 62  Only the statutes of North Dakota,
Minnesota, and South Carolina provide this exact basis for
relief.2 6 3 In a majority of states, oppression is the standard for
equitable relief or dissolution.2 64  When the term "unfairly
prejudicial" was added to the Minnesota statute, it replaced the
term "presistently unfair.'' 2 65 To prove "presistently unfair"
255. N.D. CENT. CODE S 10-19.1-115(l)(b)(2) (1985).
256. Id. 5 10-19.1-115(3).
257. Id.
258. The reasonable expectations of a shareholder may justify relief without reference to the acts
of the controlling shareholders. See In re Topper, 107 Misc. 2d 25, .., 433 N.Y.S.2d 359, 362
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980) (whether discharge of minority shareholder was for cause or in good business
judgment is irrelevant when his reasonable expectations are severely damaged). The nonintervention
framework allows the controlling shareholders to exercise their judgment. See Exadaktilos v.
Cinnaminson Realty Co, 167 N.J. Super. 141, -, 400 A.2d 554, 561-62 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1979), aff'd per curiam, 173 N.J. Super. 559, 414 A.2d 994 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980)
(controlling shareholders' conduct in discharging minority shareholder upheld despite frustration of
minority shareholder's reasonable expectations).
259. CompareN.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-115(1) (1985) with MINN. STAT. ANN. S 302A.751(1)
(West 1985).
260. See Act of June 14, 1983, ch. 368, § 9, 1983 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 2776, 2780 (West)
(current version at MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.751(1) (West 1985)).
261. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.751 reporter's notes - 1982 to 1984 (West 1985).
262. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19,1-1 15(l)(b)(2) (1985).
263. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.751(l)(b)(2) (West 1985); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-
115(1)(b)(2) (1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-21-150(a)(4)(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1985).
264. For a listing of dissolution statutes, see supra note 86.
265. See Act of June 14, 1983, ch. 368, § 9, 1983 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 2776, 2780 (West)
(current version at MINN. STAT. ANN. 5 302A.751(l) (West 1985)).
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conduct under the former Minnesota statute, a shareholder was
required to show repeated instances of adverse conduct by the
directors or those in control of the corporation. 266 This definition
was consistent with some courts' view that oppression could be
shown only through a series of acts. 267 The term "unfairly
prejudicial," by contrast, apparently requires only one instance of
adverse conduct. 
268
Because oppression is the almost universal standard, there is
little available precedent to guide a court's application of the
unfairly prejudicial standard. The draftsperson of Minnesota's
1983 amendments2 69 has noted that the term "unfairly prejudicial"
appears in several other statutes. 270 Yet the decisions interpreting
those statutes provide very little guidance. 271 It has been claimed
that the key to defining what conduct is unfairly prejudicial is the
impact that the conduct has on a minority shareholder. 27 2 Of
course, the response is that the conduct and rationale of the acts of
the controlling shareholders must also be examined. 27 3 While
unfairly prejudicial conduct undoubtedly requires a lesser degree of
oppressive and unfair treatment than persistently unfair conduct, it
is unclear how the former term compares to broader definitions of
oppression.
27 4
The answer to that question may be found in the
considerations the court's are to use in determining whether to
order relief. The first of these considerations, contained in
266. SeeMINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.751 reporter's notes - 1982 to 1984(West 1985).
267. See, e.g., Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 264 Or. 614, __, 507 P.2d 387, 394
&n.14 (1973).
268. SeeMINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.751 reporter's notes - 1982 to 1984 (West 1985).
269. J.E. Olson, a professor of law at Hamline University School of Law, was the draftsperson
of the 1983 amendments to the Minnesota Business Corporation Act. See Olson, supra note 5, at
627n. *.
270. Olson, supra note 5, at 639; see N.J. REV. STAT. § 14A: 12-7(l)(c) (Supp. 1982); S.C. CooE
ANN. § 33-21-150(a)(4)(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1985). The New.Jersey statute does not, in fact,
employ the term "unfairly prejudicial," but relies instead on the term "unfairly." See N.J. REV.
STAT. § 14A: 12-7(l)(c) (Supp. 1985).
271. Minnesota courts have yet to address unfairly prejudicial conduct as an independent source
of relief. See infra notes 294-300 and accompanying text. South Carolina courts have decided cases
under its unfairly prejudicial statute. See, e.g., Segall v. Shore, 269 S.C. 31, __, 236 S.E.2d 316,
318 (1977) (controlling shareholders' acts were oppressive and unfairly prejudicial). However, the
South Carolina courts have yet to develop a working definition of the statutory language. Note, supra
note 35, at 1146.
272. Olson, supra note 5, at 640. Olson contends that "[tihe court should look to the nature and
magnitude of the prejudicial effects of the conduct in question. The standard is not one of frequency
nor one of course of conduct, but rather prejudicial impact." Id. This claim is consistent with the
intervention framework and provides one definition ofoppression that has no reference to the actions
of the controlling shareholders. See supra notes 150-58 and accompanying text.
273. The nonintervention framework allows controlling shareholders to exercise their business
judgment despite problems it might cause the minority shareholders. See supra notes 246-53 and
accompanying text.
274. If oppression is defined with reference to the controlling shareholders' fiduciary duty and
the reasonable expectations of the shareholders, it would appear to provide as broadly based relief as
relief under an unfairly prejudicial standard.
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subsection 10-19.1-115(3) of the North Dakota Century Code, is
the duty shareholders owe to one another to act in an honest, fair,
and reasonable manner. 275 The provision establishes a fiduciary
duty between the shareholders. 276 The existence of that duty was
judicially established in Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. in which the
court held that shareholders owe one another a duty of strict good
faith. 2
77
The fiduciary duty provision of subsection 10-19.1-115(3) of
the North Dakota Century Code is difficult to interpret for two
reasons. First, it is not a codification of any common existing
standard. 278 In Minnesota the original version of the 1983
amendment incorporated the holding from Donahue.279  The
amendment was changed so that the language would "specify in a
realistic manner" the operative terms that describe the fiduciary
duty existing between the shareholders. 280 However, it is unlikely
that the language adopted - honest, fair, and reasonable - is any
more realistic or specific than any other existing standard.
Adoption of the Donahue standard would have provided at least the
guidance from past applications.
28 1
Second, and most importantly, describing the duty does not
guide the court in applying the previously discussed frameworks.
Obviously, two perspectives are possible. The first applies the
analysis of the intervention framework. Under this framework, the
acts of the controlling shareholders are considered oppressive if
they violate the controlling shareholders' duty to act in the strictest
good faith.2 82  According to the intervention framework, no
allowance is made for the possiblity that the acts of the controlling
shareholders are within their rights as controlling shareholders or
are within their business judgment. 28 3 The second perspective
275. N.D. CENT. CODE S 10-19.1-115(3) (1985).
276. See Olson, supra note 5, at 647. In construing subdivision 3a of § 751 of the Minnesota
Statutes, Olson contends that the subdivision clearly establishes the existence of a fiduciary duty
among all shareholders of a closely held corporation. Id. (emphasis in original); see MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 302A.751 (3)(a) (West 1985). Subdivision 3a of § 751 is almost identical to § 10-19.1-115 (3)
of the North Dakota Century Code. Compare MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.751 (3)(a) (West 1985) with
N.D. CENT. CODE § 10- 19.1-115(3)(1985).
277. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, . 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (1975).
278. See, e.g., id. (fiduciary duty standard is "utmost good faith and loyalty").
279. See Olson, supra note 5, at 650 & n. 145.
280. Id. at 651-52. Olson contends that the scope of the fiduciary duty under the Minnesota
provision is, and must be, "left tojudicial determination on a case-by-case basis with reference to the
extensive precedent existing under partni ship law and developing under corporate law and to the
facts of the particular case." Id. at 652.
281. See Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657 (1976);
Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975).
282. See supra notes 101-21 and accompanying text.
283. See Olson, supra note 5, at 652. Olson notes that "[the fiduciary duty standardl is not
subject . . . to such traditional corporate norms as the majority rule principle or the business
judgment rule .... " Id.
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applies the analysis of the nonintervention framework. Under this
framework, the controlling shareholders are allowed to exercise
their business judgment and control the corporation because they
have a larger voice in corporate affairs. 284 A court looking for
guidance is faced with a choice between the two perspectives
because neither framework can be entirely reconciled with the
other.
The second consideration a court must apply in determining
whether to order equitable relief or dissolution under section 10-
19.1-115 is "the reasonable expectations of the shareholders as they
exist at the inception and develop during the course of the
shareholders' relationship with the corporation and with each
other.' '285 As noted above, recent decisions have used the
reasonable expectations of shareholders to interpret oppression.2 86
A shareholder's reasonable expectations may provide the
perspective from which a court can judge whether the acts of the
controlling shareholders have been unfairly prejudicial. 287
Again, difficulties with the interpretation exist. While a
number of cases have addressed the analysis of a shareholder's
reasonable expectations, 288 other courts have refused to consider a
shareholder's reasonable expectations as broadly as subsection 10-
19.1-115(3) apparently mandates. 289  More importantly, the
description of the reasonable expectations of the shareholders
provides no guidance for the application of the frameworks. Again,
the two frameworks provide two perspectives. The first perspective
applies the analysis of the intervention framework when the
reasonable expectations of the shareholders are to be fulfilled, and
a failure to do so constitutes oppression or unfairly prejudicial
conduct.2 90 Under the intervention framework, it is irrelevant
whether the controlling shareholders' actions were the result of a
284. See supra notes 231-44 and accompanying text.
285. N.D. CENT. CODE 5 10-19.1-115(3) (1985).
286. See, e.g., Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 167 N.J. Super. 141, 400 A.2d 554 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979), aff'd per curiam, 173 N.J. Super. 559, 414 A.2d 994 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1980); In re Topper, 107 Misc. 2d 25, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980).
287. See supra notes 122-28 and accompanying text.
288. See, e.g., Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 167 N.J. Super. 141, 400 A.2d 554 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979), aff'd per curiam, 173 N.J. Super. 559, 414 A.2d 994 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1980); In re Topper, 107 Misc. 2d 25, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980); see also
Peeples, supra note 20, at 501-06 (discussion of reasonable expectations approach and cases applying
that approach).
289.Subsection 10-19.1-115(3) of the North Dakota Century Code requires that the court
consider the reasonable expectations of the shareholders as they exist at the inception and develop
during the course of the shareholders' relationship with each other. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-
115(3) (1985). But see Gimpel v. Bolstein, 125 Misc. 2d 45, 477 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1984). In Gimpel, the court found the reasonable expectations approach inappropriate when the
corporation is in an advanced stage of existence. Id. at __, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 1019. The court noteo
that when shareholders acquire their interest by bequest or gift from other parties, they do not
choose to be business associates and thus are unlike partners in an incorporated partnership. Id.
Establishing reasonable expectations becomes very difficult in such a situation. Id.
290. See supra notes 140-46 and accompanying text.
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valid exercise of business judgment. 29t The second perspective
applies the analysis of the nonintervention framework. Under this
perspective, the frustration of a shareholder's reasonable
expectations does not necessarily equal unfairly prejudicial
conduct. If the controlling shareholders were justified in taking the
actions that caused the frustration of the shareholder's reasonable
expectations, no relief is available.
2 92
With respect to both of the considerations that the court will
apply to determine what conduct is unfairly prejudicial, a choice
between two perspectives exists. The choice of which perspective to
apply is political. One perspective is no more correct than the
other. 293 A court may justify intervention with reference to one
framework or justify nonintervention with reference to the other.
Because of the relatively short time the Minnesota
amendments have been in place, little guidance can be obtained
from Minnesota decisions. One district court decision, however,
deserves comment. In Frenzel v. Logisticks, Inc., 294 the minority
shareholders in a group of related closely held corporations sued the
controlling shareholders and corporations for, among other things,
several breaches of fiduciary duty. 295 In its findings of fact, the
court found that the controlling shareholders had eliminated
cumulative voting, paid only the minimum amount of dividends
required to avoid penalty, and attempted to freeze-out the plaintiffs
by making unfairly low offers for their stock.2 96 In addition, the
controlling shareholders had commingled their personal business
ventures with the affairs of the corporation and engaged in various
activities that represented a conflict of interest.2 97 After noting the
existence of the controlling shareholders' fiduciary duty to the
minority shareholders, 298 the court concluded that the acts of the
controlling shareholders were fraudulent, illegal, and unfairly
prejudicial in violation of the Minnesota statute.2 99 The court
291. See, e.g., In re Topper, 107 Misc. 2d 25, -, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359, 362 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1980). For a discussion of the reasonable expectations approach, see supra notes 147-49 and
accompanying text.
292. See. e.g., Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 167 N.J. Super. 141, -, 400 A.2d
554, 561-62 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979), aff'dper curiam, 173 N.J. Super. 559, 414 A.2d 994
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980). For a discussion of this approach, see supra notes 246-53 and
accompanying text.
293. See supra note 17.
294. File No. 457733 (Minn. Dist. Ct., Ramsey County, Oct. 31, 1985).
295. See Frenzel v. Logisticks, Inc., File No. 457733, findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
order forjudgment at 91-94 (Minn. Dist. Ct., Ramsey County, Oct. 31, 1985).
296. Id. at 91-92.
297. Id. at 91-92, 95-96.
298. Id. at 99.
299. Id. at 100.
1986]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
ordered dissolution of the corporations and liquidation of their
assets. 300
Although Frenzel stands as an example of a court intervening to
protect the minority shareholders, it sheds little light on the
provisions of the statute. Because the activities of the controlling
shareholders were both illegal and fraudulent, as well as unfairly
prejudicial, relief would have been justified under a much narrower
statute.
The tension that exists between the two frameworks is not
resolved by North Dakota's involuntary dissolution statute. That
tension allows the courts to exercise a great deal of flexibility in
dealing with the problems of the closely held corporation. A court's
decision, whether to intervene to protect the rights of minority
shareholders or not to intervene, thereby insulating the decisions
of the controlling shareholders, may be justified by reference to the
appropriate framework. The statute itself does nothing more than
direct the inquiry. The result of a court's inquiry is dependent
upon which framework it chooses to apply.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article does not claim to set out the one appropriate
analysis of the new North Dakota involuntary dissolution statute.
Rather, it attempts to provide possible structures within which
corporate behavior may be judged. If protection of minority
shareholders is the goal, counsel should employ the intervention
framework. The argument should be framed so that a violation of
the controlling shareholders' fiduciary duty, or the frustration of a
minority shareholder's reasonable expectations constitutes
oppression or unfairly prejudicial conduct, without reference to the
reasons for the controlling shareholders' acts. If protection of the
directors' and controlling shareholders' acts is the goal, counsel
should employ the nonintervention framework. The argument
should be framed so that the directors and controlling shareholders
are allowed to exercise their business judgment and to operate the
business in the manner that they deem is in the best interests of the
corporation. The choice of the goal will determine the analysis and
the outcome.
300. Id. at 102-04. After judgment was ordered, the controlling shareholders bought out the
minority shareholders, thereby preventing dissolution of the corporations. See Minneapolis Star and
Tribune, Nov. 23, 1985, at9B, col. 6.
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